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An old and cardinal rule of contract law requires that expec-
tancy damages for breach of contract put the injured party in the
position she would have occupied had the contract been per-
formed.' Courts and commentators have accepted this full per-
formance compensation principle as the central objective of the ex-
pectancy remedy, pursuant to which they have developed many
more precise formulas for various types of cases. 2 But the simplic-
ity of the full performance principle disguises substantial problems
in its application. One of the least recognized of these problems is
the tendency of courts and commentators to determine the con-
tractual expectancy ex post (from circumstances that exist at the
time for performance) rather than ex ante (from economic oppor-
tunities fixed at the moment of contract).
Consider the choice between market damages and lost profits
in breached contracts for the sale of goods traded in well-devel-
oped markets.3 Where a contract calls for delivery of goods traded
t Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Professor of Law and Member, Center for Advanced Studies,
University of Virginia.
This article has benefited from numerous discussions with Charles Goetz, who deserves
equal credit for any insights it contributes. I would also like to thank Bob Cooter, John
Donohue, Daniel Friedmann, Tom Jackson, Saul Levmore, Paul Mahoney, Menachem
Mautner, Alan Schwartz, Paul Stephan, Bill Stuntz, and the participants at the Symposium
on Modern Contract Law, Tel-Aviv University, March 25-27, 1990, for their helpful com-
ments on earlier versions of this article.
See, for example, Robinson v Harman, 154 Eng Rep 363 (Exch 1848).
2 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.1 at 146-49; § 12.8 at 185-86; § 12.9 at 196-98
(Little, Brown, 2d ed 1990). The Uniform Commercial Code provides one of numerous ex-
amples of the salience of full performance compensation: "The remedies provided by this
Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as
good a position as if the other party had fully performed. . . " American Law Institute,
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-106(1) (West, 2d ed 1987) ("UCC"). Courts echo this theme.
See, for example, Western Geophysical Co. of America, Inc. v Bolt Associates, Inc., 584 F2d
1164, 1172 (2d Cir 1978) (proper measure of contract damages is the "amount necessary to
put [plaintiff] in as good a position as [it] would have been if the defendant had abided by
the contract" (quoting Perma Research & Development Co. v The Singer Co., 402 F Supp
881, 898 (S D NY 1975))).
3 Market damages and lost profits represent different conceptions of contractual expec-
tancy. The choice between them does not implicate the fundamental choice between expec-
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in a fluctuating market, the market itself fixes the value of the sup-
plier's performance. Thus, common law courts and subsequent
statutory codifications typically have regarded the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market price at the time of deliv-
ery as the proper measure of recovery. This sum, combined with
the proceeds of any market purchase or resale, will ordinarily equal
full performance compensation.
In some situations, however, had the seller delivered the goods
and the buyer accepted them, the injured party would not have
derived its economic gain from the fluctuation in market value.
Such was the case in Nobs Chemical, U.S.A., Inc. v Koppers Co.,
Inc.,4 where the seller entered into a fixed-price supply contract
with a Brazilian firm to acquire the contract goods for the buyer.
The contract guaranteed the seller a $95,000 profit on the deal.
Thereafter, the market price for the contract goods fell dramati-
cally. Before the seller acquired the goods from the supplier, the
buyer breached. After the seller secured a release from the sup-
plier, it sued for damages of $300,000 measured by the difference
between the contract price and the market price at the time for
performance.5 Finding the claim for market damages excessive, the
court limited the seller to the $95,000 profit it would have earned
had the contract been performed.
The concern that market damages may overcompensate is mir-
rored by the concern that they may undercompensate. For exam-
ple, market damages are often thought to deny a "volume" seller
full recovery for the loss of a sale that cannot be replaced by resel-
ling the goods to another buyer on the market. Most courts at
common law and under the various sales acts limited the volume
tation and reliance damages, discussed in Charles Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Enforcing
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L J 1261 (1980).
616 F2d 212 (5th Cir 1980).
' Market damages will exceed the post-breach economic loss of the injured party only
in cases such as Nobs Chemical where the contract between the aggrieved party and the
third party is contingent or the aggrieved party negotiates a release from liability. Other-
wise, market damages will equal ex post economic loss, because the aggrieved party must
pay compensatory damages to the third party.
6 616 F2d at 216-17. For a more complete discussion of Nobs Chemical and related
cases, see text accompanying notes 66-74. An analogous problem occurs when the seller
breaches a fixed price contract (after the market rises) and the buyer has, before breach,
contracted to resell the goods at a fixed price to a remote purchaser. In this case, modern
courts have been similarly inclined to limit the buyer to its lost profit measured by the
difference between the contract price and the resale price, rather than awarding full market
damages based on the market price at the time for performance. See, for example, Allied
Canners & Packers, Inc. v Victor Packing Co., 162 Cal App 3d 905, 209 Cal Rptr 60 (1984)
and text accompanying notes 76-78.
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seller to market damages whenever there was an available market
for the goods.7 But the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code8
stimulated a reconsideration of the common law rule and led to
new challenges to the use of market damages for breach of con-
tracts with retailers, jobbers, and other volume sellers.9
The perceived inadequacies of market damages have sparked
vigorous academic debate. Some commentators have suggested
that market damages invariably fail to mirror full performance
compensation and should be replaced in all cases by direct proof of
the profits the injured party anticipated from the breached con-
tract.10 Others have argued for selective expansion in the use of
lost profits measures." In each case, the arguments proceed from
the common assumption that market damages provide an inaccu-
rate measure of the injured party's loss. This sustained criticism
has driven many courts to retreat to the simple commands of the
full performance principle. 2 The resulting trend toward lost prof-
See, for example, Rodocanachi, Sons & Co. v Milburn Bros., 18 QBD 67 (1886);
United States v Burton Coal Co., 273 US 337 (1927); Uniform Sales Act § 64(3); Arthur
Corbin, 5 Contracts § 1100 (West, 1951). See also Masterton & Smith v Mayor of Brooklyn,
7 Hill 61, 72 (NY 1845); Charles McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 173 at
658-60 (West, 1935); Samuel Williston, 2 The Law Governing Sales of Goods at Common
Law and Under the Uniform Sales Act § 582 at 1434 (Baker, Voorhis, 2d ed 1924).
8 The UCC incorporates the traditional market damages measures in §§ 2-706 and 2-
708(1) (sellers' damages) and §§ 2-712 and 2-713 (buyers' damages). The aggrieved party
may promptly cover on the market using the contract price-resale (cover) price differential,
or rely on hypothetical market opportunities by proving the contract price-market price
differential. The UCC authorizes the direct recovery of lost profits only when neither mar-
ket alternative approximates the full performance position (Q 2-708(2)). For a discussion of
the UCC damages scheme from the perspective advanced in this paper, see Part III.B.
' See generally James J. White and Robert S. Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code§§ 7-8 to 7-14 (West, 3d ed 1988); Robert Childres, Buyer's Remedies: The Danger of Sec-
tion 2-713, 72 Nw U L Rev 837 (1978); Robert Childres and Robert Burgess, Seller's Reme-
dies: The Primacy of UCC 2-708(2), 48 NYU L Rev 833 (1973); Robert J. Harris, A Radical
Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results
Compared, 18 Stan L Rev 66 (1965); Robert J. Harris, A General Theory for Measuring
Seller's Damages for Total Breach of Contract, 60 Mich L Rev 577 (1962); Ellen A. Peters,
Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 Yale L J 199, 273-75 (1963).
10 See, for example, Childres and Burgess, 48 NYU L Rev at 833 (cited in note 9) and
Childres, 72 Nw U L Rev at 837 (cited in note 9).
1 See Robert Cooter and Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73
Cal L Rev 1434 (1985); Victor P. Goldberg, An Economic Analysis of the Lost-Volume Re-
tail Seller, 57 S Cal L Rev 283 (1984); John A. Sebert, Remedies Under Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code: An Agenda for Review, 130 U Pa L Rev 360 (1981); and Wil-
liam L. Schlosser, Construing UCC Section 2-708(2) to Apply to the Lost-Volume Seller, 24
Case W Res L Rev 686 (1973).
"2 Cases awarding lost profits because market damages were seen as exceeding full per-
formance compensation are collected in note 60. Cases holding market damages inadequate
to achieve full performance compensation are collected in note 38.
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its awards seems to have completely reversed the longstanding
common law preference for market damages."
This article argues that the modern development is unfortu-
nate and results from an incomplete understanding of the function
of damage rules and the meaning of full performance compensa-
tion. Damage rules are contract terms. They do not merely mea-
sure losses differently; they allocate risks between the parties dif-
ferently. Lost profits damages reflect an ex post perspective. They
measure the value of the completed contract based on what the
parties actually did. Market damages, on the other hand, apply a
measure of events extrinsic to the parties' behavior. Before one
measures damages, therefore, one must first decide how the parties
expressly or impliedly allocated the relevant market risks.1 The
question is not which damage rule better protects a given economic
advantage. Rather, the question is what economic advantage the
contract protects. In short, before one can place the injured party
in the same position as if the parties had performed the contract,
one must know which perspective on risk allocation the contract
adopts.
In Part I, I review the current debate over alternative damage
rules. The confusion in the literature stems from two related
problems: the failure of legal analysts to distinguish between ex
ante and ex post perspectives, and the failure of economic analysts
to distinguish between ideal damages and more pragmatic default
rules suitable for the broadest number of bargainers. To clarify
this confusion, I develop a conceptual framework that focuses ex-
plicitly on the risk allocating function of alternative damage rules
"3 Not all courts and commentators have applauded the trend toward lost profits dam-
ages. See, for example, A. Lenobel, Inc. v Senif, 252 AD 533, 300 NYS 226, 229-30 (1937);
R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v Diasonics, Inc., 826 F2d 678, 684 (7th Cir 1987); Charles Goetz
and Robert E. Scott, Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost Profits Puzzle, 31 Stan L Rev
323 (1979). See also Morris G. Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of UCC Section 2-
708(2) (One Profit for the Reseller), 24 Case W Res L Rev 697 (1973); Comment, A Theo-
retical Postscript: Microeconomics and the Lost-Volume Seller, 24 Case W Res L Rev 712
(1973).
The polar issue of limiting damages to lost profits has received less attention in the
literature. Most commentary approves of the modern trend. See sources cited in note 2. The
one recent article expressing skepticism about the wisdom of lost profit limitations is David
Simon and Gerald A. Novack, Limiting the Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits: A
Challenge to the Enforceability of Market Contracts, 92 Harv L Rev 1395 (1979).
14 To be sure, both market damages and lost profits are ex post in the sense that both
measure what happened, not what the parties thought would happen. But market damages
do reflect an ex ante perspective, as though, viewed from the time of contract, we did not
know what would happen to these particular parties or how they would react to the ex-
change of market risk.
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in market contracts. The risk allocating function of market con-
tracts is ubiquitous.15 A fixed-price contract functions as an option
on the future supply of the goods at the contract price. Market
damages reflect the ex ante value of the option. Application of a
lost profits measure in those cases where the ex ante and ex post
values diverge actually modifies the option contract by limiting or
expanding the breacher's liability. Thus, the prevailing judicial ap-
proach to measuring damages has far-reaching feedback effects on
the contractual allocation of risk.
In Part II, I advance the hypothesis that most parties to fixed
price market contracts would prefer the risk allocation implicit in a
market damages award. I test this hypothesis in two environments
where market damages are thought to be inappropriate. In cases
where market damages are seen as excessive because the injured
party has laid off a portion of the contract risk, a lost profits rule
functions as an implied limited-remedy provision.16 In the polar
case where buyers breach contracts with volume sellers, a lost prof-
its rule functions as an implied cancellation penalty.17 In both
cases, a lost profits rule allocates market risks in an inefficient and
unstable way. In a hypothetical bargain among sellers and buyers
of goods traded in an available market, parties would generally
prefer a contract term providing for market damages to one pro-
viding for lost profits.
In Part III, I use the risk allocation perspective as a guide for
interpreting the damage rules specified in Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. The UCC's drafters recognized both the risk al-
location and measurement functions of damage rules. The various
provisions of the UCC are best harmonized, therefore, by a pre-
sumption favoring the common law preference for market dam-
ages. I conclude that the lost profits "revolution" lacks support in
15 In fluctuating markets, fixed-price contracts serve principally to exchange the risk of
market shifts. In the case of retail sales of durable goods, the fixed-price contract reserves a
claim to a future supply of the goods. See Part I.B.3.
11 I will argue that permitting a breacher to capture the benefits from the third-party
contract motivates strategic breach. Furthermore, a lost profits measure triggered only by
certain post-contract actions (such as the decision to lay off a portion of the risk) will neces-
sarily skew the risk-bearing choices of the performing party. See text accompanying notes
71-74.
" Unhappily, the precise amount of this penalty depends on facts known only to the
seller. Thus, I will argue that if a meaningful number of buyers value a "right of cancella-
tion" (as is customary in the retailing of soft goods), adopting a lost profits measure as the
standard legal rule in lost volume cases will inefficiently limit the seller's market. Most par-
ties apprised of these circumstances would prefer to grant buyers a right of cancellation
subject to payment of market damages (including incidental expenses) or to contract explic-
itly for fixed-sum deposits. See text accompanying notes 84-91.
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either the common law or contemporary statutory analysis, and
that it clashes with the underlying objectives of most parties to
market contracts. The legal system can best facilitate sales trans-
actions by reinforcing the historic preference for market damages.
I. THE FUNCTION OF DAMAGE RULES IN MARKET CONTRACTS
A. The Lost Profits Puzzle Reconsidered
1. A brief history: market damages versus lost profits.
The common law universally applied a market damages rule in
breach of contract actions involving market-traded goods. Common
law courts regarded any transactions between the injured party
and third parties as irrelevant. 18 Regardless of the economic gain
the plaintiff might have received from full performance, the mar-
ket value of the goods on the agreed date of delivery determined
damages. As one commentator pointed out in an early treatise,
market damages represented "the actual value of the goods at the
time agreed upon for delivery," an amount fixed at that moment,
regardless of whether the injured party later "keeps, sells, gives
away, or destroys the goods.""' Thus, in its early development the
rule of market damages measured loss without regard to the in-
jured party's specific circumstances or intentions.
Market damages create no problems whenever the injured
party can transform the particular contractual advantage into the
market.20 Assume that Seller contracts to sell market-traded goods
to Buyer for $100, delivery in six months. At the date of delivery,
the market price has fallen to $50 and Buyer breaches. If Seller
has not hedged or laid off the contract with a third party, its loss is
unquestionably measured by the $50 contract-market differential.
By combining the $50 damages with the $50 earned from reselling
the contract goods at the lower market price, Seller receives the
" See, for example, United States v Burton Coal Co., 273 US 337 (1927) (difference
between $6.75 contract price and $2.15 market price allowed despite contract with third
party supplier at $6.30); Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 248
Mass 502, 143 NE 312 (1924) (difference between $4.25 contract price and $2 market value
allowed, although cost of production in plaintiff's mines from which he had to furnish the
coal was $3.10); Recent Decisions, 27 Colum L Rev 870, 877 (1927) (listing cases).
9 Theodore Sedgwick, 3 A Treatise on the Measure of Damages § 855 at 1770 (Baker,
Voorhis, 9th ed 1912) (emphasis in original).
2 The relevance of market transformation was well understood at common law. See, for
example, Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v Providence Churning Co., 45 RI 180, 121 A 123,
124-25 (1923) (in action against purchaser for breach of contract for coconut oil, proper to
instruct that cost of production was immaterial, since the seller was at liberty to purchase
oil on the market to fulfill the contract).
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same economic benefit it would have enjoyed had Buyer accepted
delivery.
But the injured party cannot always transform its contract
rights into the market. Assume, for example, that before the date
of performance, Seller enters into a contingent contract with a
third-party supplier. The contract provides that if Seller supplies
goods to Buyer, Seller must acquire them from Supplier at a fixed
price of $80. When Buyer defaults, Seller exercises its option not
to acquire the goods from Supplier. Under these circumstances,
market damages of $50 result in a greater profit for Seller than the
$20 it would have earned if Buyer had accepted delivery and paid
for the contract goods. Seller's supply contract has frozen its po-
tential share of any future market fall and has released the balance
of that market advantage to the remote supplier.21
Notwithstanding this apparent discrepancy between market
damages and full performance compensation, most common law
courts continued to award full market damages, holding that any
third party contract was irrelevant in computing the injured
party's loss.2 2 The rule became universally accepted in England
and the Commonwealth countries following the decision in Rodo-
canachi, Sons & Co. v Milburn Brothers in 1886.23 In refusing to
take account of a resale contract that appeared to limit the loss of
a plaintiff buyer, the court announced: "If there is a market there
is no occasion to have recourse to [lost profit modes] of estimating
the value [of the contract]. The value will be the market value
2 See Simon and Novack, 92 Harv L Rev at 1404 (cited in note 13). The problem arises
only where the injured party is partially or entirely excused from the third-party contract.
See note 5. If the supplier/seller contract is not contingent, then the lost profits remedy will
obviously harm Seller because it receives truncated damages from Buyer but is liable to
Supplier for full market damages.
22 Stebel v United States, 69 F Supp 221, 223 (Ct Cl 1947) (resale contract does not
limit market damages award); Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v International Agr. Corp., 146
Tenn 451, 243 SW 81, 85 (1922) (market damages awarded rather than lost profits plus any
sum owed to third party); Clinton Oil & Mfg. Co. v Carpenter, 113 SC 10, 101 SE 47, 50
(1919) (resale contracts do not limit award of market damages); Floyd v Mann, 146 Mich
356, 109 NW 679, 684 (1906) (same); and cases cited in note 18.
A minority of courts have held that the injured party should be limited to lost profits
when it was fully protected against the breach by a contingency clause in the third-party
contract. See Foss v Heineman, 144 Wis 146, 128 NW 881, 883-85 (1910) (injured party had
no liability to third party because its contract was contingent). McCormick regarded this as
the "better" view. McCormick, Damages § 175 at 669 (cited in note 7).
22 18 QBD 67 (1886). See also Williams Bros. v Ed T. Agius, Ltd., 1914 App Cas 510,
520 (Rodocanachi approved and followed by House of Lords).
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when the goods ought to have arrived. But the value is to be taken
independently of any circumstances peculiar to the plaintiff."'24
It thus became well settled that, in an action for nondelivery
or nonacceptance of goods under a contract of sale, the law would
not take into account anything accidental as between the plaintiff
and the defendant, such as an intermediate contract with a third
party for the purchase or sale of the goods.2" The common law
courts justified their adherence to market damages by focusing on
the plaintiff's risk. Lord Esher stated in Rodocanachi:
It is admitted in this case that, if the plaintiff [buyers] had
sold the goods for more than the market value before their
arrival, they could not recover on the basis of that price but
would be confined to the market price, because the circum-
stance that they had so sold the goods at a higher price would
be an accidental circumstance as between themselves and the
[defendants]; but it is said that, as they have sold for a price
less than the market price, the market price is not to govern.
I think, that if the law were so, it would be very unjust. 6
In other words, if the injured party bore the risk of an unfavorable
fluctuation in the market, it should receive a favorable fluctuation
when the market turned to its advantage."
Early codifications of the law of sales retained the common
law insistence on market damages whenever goods are traded in
well-developed markets. The Uniform Sales Act, drafted by Sam-
uel Williston, largely codified common law rules.2" Under the Sales
Act, if an "available market" for the goods existed, then the con-
tract-market differential determined damages unless special cir-
cumstances established a greater loss.2 9 As with the common law,
the market damages rule applied under the Sales Act even when it
placed the injured party in a better position than if the deal had
been completed. In one case a seller agreed to supply the govern-
ment with coal at a price of $6.75 per ton from certain specified
mines not owned by the seller.30 The seller made contracts with
24 18 QBD at 76-77.
21 Simon and Novack, 92 Harv L Rev at 1405-1412 (cited in note 13); Samuel Williston,
11 A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1388 at 425 (Baker, Voorhis, 3d ed 1968).
26 18 QBD at 77.
2' Professor Farnsworth identifies this as the reciprocity principle. See H. Allan Farns-
worth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of
Contract, 94 Yale L J 1339, 1374 (1985).
2 McCormick, Damages § 172 at 657 (cited in note 7).
29 Uniform Sales Act §§ 64(3), 67(3). The market damages test was also codified in the
English Sale of Goods Act of 1894. Sale of Goods Act, 1894, 56 & 57 Vict, ch 71, § 51(3).
20 Burton Coal, 273 US at 338-39.
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these mines to furnish the coal for about $6.30 per ton. After the
market value had fallen to $2.15 per ton, the government refused
to take the coal. The seller in turn declined (apparently without
liability) to take the coal from the mines.31 Applying the Sales Act,
the Supreme Court awarded the seller full market damages of
$4.60 per ton even though the seller would have earned a profit of
only 45 cents per ton had the government accepted the goods.2
In an even greater number of cases, market damages appeared
to undercompensate the injured party significantly. Market dam-
ages often limited retail sellers of standard-priced goods to nomi-
nal or incidental damages for breach. This apparent anomaly sup-
ported a wider access to lost profits damages in cases involving
"lost volume" sellers.33 These sellers contended that, although they
did in fact resell the contract goods, the other buyer would have
purchased anyway. Therefore, if the breaching buyer had fully per-
formed the contract, the seller would have realized two profits
from two sales. Because selling the goods to the second buyer pro-
duced only one profit for the seller, the breaching party ought to
compensate for the lost profit in order to put the seller in the posi-
tion it would have achieved had the buyer performed.3 4
The situations in which market damages seemed unable to im-
plement the full performance principle led to revision of the dam-
ages rule. The initial revision of the Uniform Sales Act eliminated
the "available market" standard which had limited the use of lost
profits measures. Instead, the section provided that the measure of
damages would be the difference between the contract price and
the market price, "except that if the foregoing measure of damages
is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance
would have done then the measure of damages is the profit the
seller would have made from full performance by the buyer."3 " Al-
though the draft did not include commentary to explain the
31 At trial the seller did not introduce any evidence that it was bound to take or pay for
any of the coal ordered from the designated mines, and made no claim for damages suffered
by the suppliers. Id at 339.
31 Id at 340-41. See also Garfield & Proctor Coal Co., 143 NE at 312; Iron Trade Prod-
ucts Co. v Wilkoff Co., 272 Pa 172, 116 A 150 (1922) (market damages awarded despite
buyer's release from liability to third party purchaser).
33 See Stewart v Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 P 959, 961 (1923); Torkomian v Russell, 90
Conn 481, 97 A 760, 761-62 (1916). See also Electrical Products Corp. of Colorado v Mosko,
88 Colo 447, 297 P 991, 994 (1931) (lost profits analysis applied to lease for custom-built
sign).
31 See Goetz and Scott, 31 Stan L Rev at 323 (cited in note 13).
35 Uniform Sales Act § 110 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944), in Elizabeth Kelly, ed, 2
Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 58 (Rothman, 1984) ("UCC Drafts").
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change, a clear indication of the drafter's concerns appeared when
the Uniform Revised Sales Act was incorporated into the 1949
draft of Article 2 of the UCC. The revised section became UCC §
2-708, and the Code drafters provided the following comment:
The provision of this section permitting recovery of expected
profits where the standard measure of damages is inadequate,
together with the new requirement that price actions may be
sustained only where resale is impractical, are designed to
eliminate the unfair and economically wasteful results aris-
ing under the older law when fixed price articles were in-
volved. This section permits recovery of lost profits in all ap-
propriate cases, which would include all standard priced
goods."
Following the adoption of the UCC, the attack on market
damages has only intensified. Numerous commentators, 7 now
joined by many courts,38 assert that when market transformation is
11 UCC § 2-708, Comment 2 (1949 draft) (emphasis added), in UCC Drafts at 251 (cited
in note 35).
37 In addition to sources cited in note 9, see Ryden Anderson, Pitfalls for Sellers and
Buyers Under the Market Formula of Section 2-708, 4 Rev Litig 251 (1985); William
Schlosser, Damages for the Lost-Volume Seller: Does an Efficient Formula Already Exist?,
17 UCC L J 238 (1985); John A. Sebert, Remedies Under Article Two of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: An Agenda for Review, 130 U Pa L Rev 360 (1981); Note, Lost-Profits Dam-
age Awards Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-708(2), 27 Stan L Rev 1109 (1985);
Note, An Economic View of the UCC: Seller's Damage Measures and the Identification of
the Lost-Volume Seller, 49 Albany L Rev 889 (1985); Note, Seller's Recovery of Lost Profits
for Breach of a Sales Contract: Uniform Commercial Code § 2-708(2), 11 Wm Mitchell L
Rev 227 (1985).
88 See Teradyne, Inc. v Teledyne Industries, Inc., 676 F2d 865, 868 (1st Cir 1982)
(buyer of transistor test system liable to volume seller for lost profits because market dam-
ages would be inadequate); Blair Int'l, Ltd. v LaBarge, Inc., 675 F2d 954, 960-61 (8th Cir
1982) (jobber entitled to lost profits because market damages inadequate); Comeq, Inc. v
Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc., 456 S2d 264 (Ala 1984) (seller, a middleman, entitled to lost
profits in order to be in the same position as full performance); Neumiller Farms, Inc. v
Cornett, 368 S2d 272, 276-77 (Ala 1979) (unless there is both a market and an obligation for
the aggrieved seller to enter it, market damages are functionally inadequate); Capital Steel
Co., Inc. v Foster & Creighton Co., 264 Ark 683, 574 SW2d 256, 259-60 (1978) (lost profits
awarded to volume seller because § 1-106 requires liberal remedies in order to achieve full
performance compensation); Snyder v Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., Inc., 38 Md App 144,
380 A2d 618, 624-27 (1977) (buyer who cancelled contract for purchase and installation of
carpet liable for lost profits because market damages inadequate); Distribu-Dor, Inc. v
Karadanis, 11 Cal App 3d 463, 90 Cal Rptr 231, 235-36 (1970) (middleman allowed to re-
cover lost profits); and Coast Industries, Inc. v Noonan, 231 A2d 663, 665 (Conn App 1966)
(also allowing lost profits damages to middleman).
For cases awarding lost profits damages to volume sellers, see, for example, Neri v Re-
tail Marine Corp., 30 NY2d 393, 285 NE2d 311, 314 (1972); Islamic Republic of Iran v
Boeing Co., 771 F2d 1279, 1290 (9th Cir 1985); Tri-State Petroleum Corp. v Saber Energy,
Inc., 845 F2d 575 (5th Cir 1988); Famous Knitwear Corp. v Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F2d 251,
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not feasible, the market damage measure often does not even
closely approximate the economic loss suffered by the breach.
Moreover, the economic loss sustained when the contract is not
completed is precisely measured by the profits the injured party
anticipated from the breached contract. Conventional wisdom ar-
gues that, rather than measuring losses by indirect and apparently
inaccurate market damage measures, the common law and UCC
preference for market damages should be abandoned in favor of a
lost profits measure.3 9
2. The contemporary debate.
a) The lost volume case. Not all commentators have ar-
gued for the presumptive accuracy of lost profits measures. Con-
temporary debate focused initially on whether a lost profits rule in
fact measures the contractual expectancy more accurately than
market damages. 40 In an earlier article, Charles Goetz and I sug-
gested that determining potential gains and losses through a lost
profits measure is far more difficult than had conventionally been
assumed.4 We argued that the evolving judicial presumption that
the lost volume seller is entitled to full lost profits damages is un-
warranted. Mere ability to supply additional volume in no way im-
plies that such volume could have been supplied profitably. A lost-
volume claim may be justified if sales to other buyers are unaf-
fected by the breach because profitable volume then declines by
the full amount of the breach. Conversely, a seller loses no volume
(or, more properly, less than the full profits attributable to the
breached contract) if the breach alters its cost and demand condi-
tions so that supplying other buyers becomes newly profitable. In
some cases, the seller may save the increasing costs of producing
the contract goods for later delivery. Even when breach yields no
cost savings, the buyer's breach may nonetheless expand the
seller's market. Had the buyer elected to accept delivery and then
resell the contract goods to a potential customer of the plaintiff
seller, the buyer could have captured some (or perhaps all) of the
volume for which the seller is claiming compensation. Breach
253-55 (4th Cir 1974); Nederlandse Draadindustrie NDI B. V. v Grand Pre-Stressed Corp.,
466 F Supp 846, 853-54 (E D NY 1979); Van Ness Motors, Inc. v Vikram, 221 NJ Super
543, 535 A2d 510, 511 (1987).
3, The standard attacks on the use of market damages are well summarized in White
and Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code §§ 6-3 to 6-4 and §§ 7-6 to 7-14 (cited in note
9).
40 See sources cited in notes 9, 11 and 13.
41 See Goetz and Scott, 31 Stan L Rev at 323 (cited in note 13).
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removes this threat of competition from the breaching buyer, and
to some extent expands the seller's market.42
The legal relevance of this analysis deserves emphasis. The
UCC authorizes a lost profits award only when market damages are
"inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance
would have done.... 43 If the breaching buyer can show that, had
it "performed," it could thereafter have feasibly resold the un-
wanted goods to a potential customer of the seller, then the seller's
sales volume after the breach would equal the volume after per-
formance.44 Thus, if the appropriate comparison is between the
seller's position with or without the breach once the buyer has de-
cided not to keep the goods, the seller's actual volume will remain
the same. This is not to say, however, that the seller has not suf-
fered any economic loss. The breach costs the seller its expected
volume, determined at the time of contract. The seller should be
compensated for this lost expectancy. The question remains, how-
ever: how should the court determine this expectancy?
There have been important advances recently in the analysis
of lost volume cases. Victor Goldberg,45 and Robert Cooter and
Melvin Eisenberg,"4 argue that retail sellers incur "selling costs"
that they cannot save if the buyer fails to accept delivery. Cooter
and Eisenberg focus on the method by which retail sales are made.
Using a "fishing model" of business conduct, they argue that many
retail sellers do not pursue buyers individually by adjusting prices.
Rather, they "fish" for a number of buyers by holding prices con-
stant and incurring predetermined selling costs (advertising, sales
personnel, inventory maintenance, etc.). Substantial retailing costs
are consumed in order to obtain contracts with an estimated
"catch" of buyers. Thus, if any buyer refuses to accept delivery, a
subsequent sale to another buyer will not recoup the amortized
portion of those costs. 47 Professor Goldberg refines this argument
by suggesting that, in an imperfectly competitive environment,
these retailing costs will be roughly equivalent to the seller's gross
42 This argument is developed in detail in id at 330-46. It was explicitly adopted in R.
E. Davis Chemical Corp. v Diasonics, Inc., 826 F2d 678, 684 (7th Cir 1987).
43 UCC § 2-708(2). Under the UCC, market damages pursuant to § 2-708(1) or § 2-706
should generally be awarded except where they fail to put the seller in a situation as good as
its post-performance position.
44 In other words, a presumption in favor of lost volume damages is based on the as-
sumption that only the seller could have made the second sale. See A. Lenobel, Inc. v Senif,
252 AD 583, 300 NYS 226, 229 (1937).
11 Goldberg, 57 S Cal L Rev at 283 (cited in note 11).
46 Cooter and Eisenberg, 73 Cal L Rev at 1434 (cited in note 11).
47 Id at 1455-59.
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margin-the difference between wholesale and retail price. Since
this is essentially the seller's "lost profits," Goldberg suggests that,
at least for retail sellers, a lost profits award is a convenient proxy
for uncompensated selling costs."'
Neither of these arguments is free from difficulty.' 9 Neverthe-
less, they mark an important shift in the focus of the debate from
an ex post analysis of circumstances existing at the time for per-
formance to an ex ante evaluation of expected gains and losses.
Surprisingly, although the ex ante perspective is insightful, it has
not yet resolved the debate over lost volume damages. The contin-
uing uncertainty derives from the way commentators have framed
the issue.
Although Goldberg and Cooter/Eisenberg characterize their
analyses in terms of the lost volume debate, in reality their argu-
ments do not concern lost volume at all. The fishing model tells a
story about incidental damages, not lost profits. A volume seller
using the fishing model of business conduct incurs, for each rele-
vant period, fixed selling costs that are consumed in "catching" a
given volume of buyers. A seller saves none of these costs when one
buyer breaches. Thus, resale does not replace the lost selling ef-
forts attributable to the breached contract.5 0 This seller requires
an award of incidental damages equal to the selling costs attributa-
ble to the breached contract.5 1 The economic analysis has thus far
sought to specify an accurate measure of the expected selling costs
incurred by volume sellers. This question is highly complex and
fact-specific. 52 Moreover, courts frame the issue in terms of a dif-
, Goldberg, 57 S Cal L Rev at 292-94 (cited in note 11).
Cooter and Eisenberg comprehend well the relevant legal categories. Unfortunately,
they develop classifications using terminology of their own invention. Placing their observa-
tions in the context of an ongoing debate is difficult. Goldberg's treatment is also insightful,
but in conjoining selling costs with lost profits, he ignores the fact that a lost profits recov-
ery under UCC § 2-708(2) includes in addition the recovery of amortized fixed overhead as
well as incidental damages under § 2-710.
50 Fifty-five years ago, Charles McCormick anticipated both this argument and the
rudiments of the fishing model conceptualization. See McCormick, Damages § 173 at 661
(cited in note 7) (lost volume rule can be rationalized "as a case where there is no 'available,'
that is, immediate, 'market,' but only an eventual market costing time and effort to
capture").
"1 Under UCC § 2-710 incidental damages may be granted for "expenses... incurred in
the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, or in connection with
return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach."
" Establishing the loss suffered by a particular volume seller depends on several ques-
tions. Is the seller's market perfectly or imperfectly competitive? Does seller respond to
changes in demand by adjusting prices or inventory? What is the probability that if buyer
performed, he could resell to one of seller's customers? The answers turn on complex empir-
ical realities, and are necessarily speculative. Predicting the seller's loss requires comparing
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ferent question: they ask which damage rule is better, assuming
one must choose between lost profits and market damages. Unfor-
tunately, the recent literature does not address this question
systematically.
b) The limited remedy case. The debate over limiting
damages to lost profits (as when the injured party has contracted
with a third party prior to breach) has been no more conclusive.
Perhaps the best illustration of the courts' confusion is the well-
known case of Nobs Chemical, U.S.A., Inc. v Koppers Co., Inc.55
Koppers contracted to buy from Nobs Chemical 1,000 metric tons
of cumene, a colorless oily hydrocarbon. After Nobs had contracted
to fill the order from a Brazilian supplier, but before the time for
performance, Koppers repudiated the contract. Nobs was able to
obtain a release from its commitment to the supplier, and never
paid for or obtained possession of the contract goods. The plain-
tiff-seller nevertheless argued that it should recover market dam-
ages measured by the $300,000 difference between the contract
price and the market price at the time for performance. 4 The
defendant-buyer, on the other hand, argued that the seller was en-
titled only to recover lost profits of $95,000, representing the dif-
ference between the breached contract price and the fixed-price
contract with the Brazilian supplier.
In limiting the seller to lost profits, the court virtually ignored
the seemingly plain language of the UCC55 and the historic prefer-
ence for market damages. Instead, it based its reasoning almost en-
tirely on the primacy of the principle of full performance compen-
sation. The court found any preference for market damages in the
UCC language inconsistent with the principle that the "Act be lib-
erally administered to the end that the aggrieved party be put in
as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.... 56
The court held that since the seller would only have earned a
$95,000 profit, it could only recover its actual economic loss. 5
Nobs Chemical represents the clearest articulation of a "mar-
ket transformation" gloss on the award of market damages. Under
the state of affairs that exists (after the breach) with one that never occurred (the seller's
economic position had the buyer performed).
616 F2d 212 (5th Cir 1980).
See UCC § 2-708(1).
UCC § 2-708(2) provides for lost profits whenever the measure of damages in subsec-
tion (1) is "inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have
done.... ." (emphasis added).
56 UCC § 1-106.
5 616 F2d at 215.
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the rationale of Nobs Chemical, market damages are only an ap-
propriate measure when the injured party has the capacity to ex-
ploit the shift in market price at or after the time for performance
by, for example, waiting until the time for performance to acquire
the contract goods. Otherwise, an award of market damages will
violate the full performance principle.
Academic commentary has generally supported the Nobs
Chemical result as well as its reasoning. Using the time for per-
formance as the point of reference, White and Summers have
pointed out that the market damages rule disregards the possibil-
ity that a nonbreaching party may have reduced or avoided its loss
by replacing the breached contract or, in the alternative, by selling
off a portion of the market risk. 8 Thus, they conclude that "per-
haps the best explanation" of the market damages rule is that it is
a "statutory liquidated damages clause, a breach inhibitor the pay-
out of which need bear no close relation to plaintiff's actual loss."5 9
On the other hand, as others have noted, while the injured party
may have lost (or gained) less than the market shift as matters
turned out, it is also true that the breach foreclosed a contractual
opportunity to make a profit on the market.60 The expected value
of the lost opportunity (as differentiated from its value once exer-
cised) is measured by the contract-market differential and not by
the profits lost in any particular case.
The response to these arguments has been predictable. Con-
fused by the complex arguments over damage measurement, many
courts have retreated to general principles. An especially attractive
focal point has been § 1-106 of the UCC, which incorporates the
full performance principle. Section 1-106 seemingly trumps the
various arguments for market damages. Thus, the conclusion
reached by most contemporary courts is that market damages
should not be used where the award is more than the economic
gain the injured party would have enjoyed had the goods been de-
livered and accepted.'
8 White and Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code § 6-4 at 293-95 and § 7-7 at 349-
56 (cited in note 9).
Id at 295.
' Simon and Novack, 92 Harv L Rev at 1419-20 (cited in note 13).
*' See Nobs Chemical, 616 F2d at 212, 215-16; Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v Victor
Packing Co., 162 Cal App 3d 905, 209 Cal Rptr 60, 66 (1984); H-W-H Cattle Co., Inc. v
Schroeder, 767 F2d 437, 440 (8th Cir 1985); Coast Trading Co. v Cudahy Co., 592 F2d 1074,
1083 (9th Cir 1979); Union Carbide Corp v Consumers Power Co., 636 F Supp 1498, 1501 (E
D Mich 1986); and American Metal Climax, Inc. v Essex Int'l, Inc., 16 UCC Rep 101, 114-
15 (S D NY 1974). But see Trans World Metals, Inc. v Southwire Co., 769 F2d 902, 908 (2d
Cir 1985) (lost profits measure does not apply simply because contract-market differential
exceeds economic loss).
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B. The Risk Allocating Function of Damage Rules
1. Reconstructing the concept of full performance com-
pensation.
The preoccupation with ex' post damage measurement in the
debate over lost profits is symptomatic of an underlying problem:
an unduly narrow conceptualization of contract performance. Con-
ventional analysis considers performance under a sales contract
only in terms of the ultimate exchange: delivery by the seller and
payment of the contract price by the buyer. Because the economic
gain that would have been earned from delivery and payment is
the profit from the contract, it is tempting to assume that lost
profits damages, at least in theory, always equal full performance
compensation.
Unhappily, this conceptualization of contract performance is
incomplete, and the assumption is false. In fact, the notion of con-
tractual performance has no fixed or inherent meaning. The con-
tract is not just an agreement for delivery, acceptance, and pay-
ment. It also contains an express or implied term specifying
damages in case of nondelivery or nonacceptance. Contract per-
formance requires either the exchange of goods for the contract
price or the payment of an appropriate monetary substitute. In
short, the damage remedy is itself a part of the contracted-for
performance.
The choice between damage rules thus depends on how the
parties have allocated the relevant market risks. If the risks and
associated remedies are explicitly allocated in the contract, the ex-
ercise is straightforward. If not, the law must supply an appropri-
ate default rule as an implied contract term. In both cases, deter-
mination of what economic advantage is protected by the contract
must precede the necessarily narrower question of how to measure
the damages for breach.
Viewing the question of damages as an ex ante contract term
suggests that the post-performance position the injured party is
entitled to claim depends on how the contract has assigned the
risks of nondelivery or nonacceptance. Assume, for example, that
Buyer and Seller enter into a fixed-price contract for the sale of
goods in which they explicitly agree that Buyer has an option to
cancel on or before the date of delivery upon payment of a $100
cancellation charge. Obviously, "performance" in this contract does
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not just mean delivery of the goods and payment of the price.
Rather, performance means delivery of the goods and payment of
the price if the cancellation option is not exercised. No one would
argue that Seller is entitled to lost volume profits if Buyer refuses
to accept the goods on delivery. Seller's damages will be limited to
the $100 cancellation charge.
To be sure, this is a customized contract. Yet, the same princi-
ple holds for a contract in which the relevant damage and perform-
ance terms are implied. The prevailing custom in the retailing of
soft goods, for instance, is that buyers may cancel before or shortly
after accepting delivery. If Buyer exercises this cancellation privi-
lege, no one would argue that Seller should receive lost volume
profits. Custom has defined performance to include the implied
right of cancellation.2
Finally, assume a contract where there is no custom, no ex-
plicit term, and Buyer once again refuses to take delivery. What
position would Seller have occupied had Buyer "performed"? It is
clear that Seller's damages cannot be determined before the con-
tract performance is first specified. Whether lost profits or market
damages should be granted the lost volume seller thus depends on
whether a lenient or a harsh cancellation policy is implied as the
legal default rule. The nature of the cancellation policy, in turn,
depends on how the two parties allocate contract risks.
A similar analysis applies to the case where market damages
seem to overcompensate. Assume that the contract explicitly pro-
vides that Buyer either accept delivery of the contract goods or
pay the contract-market differential determined as of the date of
delivery. Thereafter, Seller contracts to acquire the goods from a
supplier at a price that will earn Seller a $50 profit if the deal goes
through. Upon breach, if the contract-market differential is $100,
Buyer cannot satisfy its contractual obligation by tendering only
the $50 profit Seller would have earned had the goods been ac-
cepted. Limiting damages to lost profits would deny Seller the ben-
efit of its bargain by reallocating contract risks from Buyer to
Seller.e" Similarly, in the more typical case where the contract is
6 The UCC implies as a state-supplied term any prevailing commercial practice in any
recognizable class of transactions. See, for example, UCC § 1-205(2).
11 One might argue that an explicit contract term providing for market damages in case
of breach would be an invalid penalty. But a stipulated damages clause is enforceable as
long as it represents a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the anticipated harm
caused by the breach. Restatement of Contracts § 339(1)(a), Comment on Subsection (1)
(1932); UCC § 2-718(1), Comment 1; Corbin, 5 Contracts § 1059 (cited in note 7); McCor-
mick, Damages § 149 at 599-608 (cited in note 7). Furthermore, most courts assess the rea-
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silent, the choice between lost profits and market damages turns
on whether this damage limitation is implied as the default rule.
In sum, the apparent dichotomy between market damages and
full performance compensation' is false. The alternative damage
rules both measure the position the aggrieved party would have
occupied upon performance, but from two different temporal per-
spectives. Lost profits reflect the injured party's ex post economic
loss; they measure the value of the completed contract at the time
of breach. Market damages, on the other hand, reliably measure
the ex ante economic opportunities purchased by the contract.
Both rules approximate full performance compensation. The ques-
tion is whether the parties agreed to measure the value of the bar-
gain ex ante rather than ex post.
2. Fashioning majoritarian default rules.
Damage rules allocate risks between contracting parties in
much the same way as the many other default rules that govern
contractual performance. Individual parties remain free to opt out
and, within limits, to design their own damages rules. In evaluating
which damage rules are "best," therefore, it is useful to identify
the terms that the broadest number of parties would likely agree to
if they had explicitly bargained out a remedial scheme. In the case
of goods traded in well-established markets, it may be possible to
deduce an optimal default rule (or at least to choose between lost
profits and market damages) by asking what remedial terms would
best facilitate the market transactions involved.
Once one understands the risk-allocating dimension of damage
rules, the question of specifying an appropriate default rule be-
comes more tractable. In a world where Coasian assumptions of
zero transactions costs hold, the damage rule is irrelevant because
parties can and will negotiate around a suboptimal legal rule. But
in a world of transactions costs anything can happen, and, absent
substantial data on those costs, one cannot predict that any given
rule is better than any other for any particular contracting parties.
Surely, though, some rule for breach of contract is preferable to no
sonableness of the stipulated damage provision ex ante. See McCarthy v Tally, 46 Cal 2d
577, 297 P2d 981, 987 (1956); Better Food Mkts. v American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal 2d 179,
253 P2d 10, 14 (1953). An ex ante perspective measures the value of the opportunity, not
the economic losses ex post. Any stipulated damages term must also pass a further test: the
possible damages must be uncertain and difficult to estimate. However, the courts have sel-
dom voided stipulated damages provisions solely because the damages were easy to esti-
mate. For cases see McCormick, Damages § 148 at 605-06.
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rule. If so, the law ought to adopt the rule that the broadest num-
ber of parties would adopt were transactions costs low enough for
negotiators to tailor-make their own rules.6 A legal rule mirroring
what most parties would adopt where transactions costs are low
saves those parties the time, cost, and error inherent in negotiating
rules and reducing them to writing. Where transactions costs are
too high for parties to fashion their own rule, it may be norma-
tively correct to provide them with the rule that they probably
would have chosen for themselves had they been able to bargain. 5
The norm of expanded choice justifies this preference for
majoritarian default rules. Implied damages rules expand parties'
choices by providing standardized and widely suitable contract
terms to cover the contingency of breach. This norm implicitly
presumes a neutral policy toward individualized agreements; the
state has no desire to impose its default rules on unwilling parties.
Viewed ex ante, therefore, individual parties lose nothing from the
specification of majoritarian default rules because they remain free
to design alternatives to the state's terms. Thus conceived, the un-
derlying objective of contract law is to develop both generalized
default rules and a menu of customized alternatives which, taken
together, reduce transactions costs for both typical and atypical
bargainers. 6
3. Selecting damage rules that fit the function of market
contracts.
Why do parties enter into a fixed-price contract for future de-
livery of goods that are traded on an open market? After all, one
can always acquire the goods on the spot market at the prevailing
price without contracting in advance. Consideration of this issue
can clarify the choice between market damages and lost profits as
alternative default rules. One answer, of course, is that the execu-
tory contract assures a reliable supply and thus smoothes out the
inevitable distortions that may result from exclusive reliance on
spot market purchases. But the buyer can fully achieve these pro-
6 This preference for majoritarian default rules does not undermine the selection of
default rules designed to stimulate further borrowing. Certain default rules are set not be-
cause they represent the ultimate allocations preferred by most bargainers, but rather be-
cause they are best suited to inducing one party to share information with the other. See
text accompanying notes 121-124.
"' See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Con-
tracts, 19 J Legal Stud 597, 606-13 (1990).
6 Id at 607. Only such an approach will support both instruments of contractual forma-
tion-generalization and particularization.
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duction efficiencies by contracting for future delivery of a specified
quantity of goods at the then-prevailing market price.
What, then, motivates parties to negotiate a fixed contract
price that may vary from the market price at the time for delivery?
Most plausibly, the parties believe it is to their mutual advantage
to exchange the risks of fluctuations in the market. If the buyer in
Nobs Chemical only wanted a guaranteed supply of cumene, the
parties would have agreed to allow the price to float. Before con-
tracting, the seller bore the risk of a subsequent decline in the
market price of cumene; the buyer bore the risk of an increase in
the market price. The fixed-price contract effectively exchanges
these risks. Thereafter, the seller bears the risk of price increases
and, in turn, possesses the reciprocal opportunity to hold the buyer
to the risk of a price decrease.
The seller may deal with the contract risk/opportunity in a
variety of ways. It can lay off the risk (as did the seller in Nobs
Chemical) by contracting to purchase the goods from a supplier at
a fixed price. Such a fixed-price supply contract enables the seller
to pool its risks by selling a portion of the contractual opportunity
to the third-party supplier. Alternatively, the seller can choose to
self-insure and bear the entire risk internally. In this case the
seller can produce the goods itself or wait and purchase them on
the spot market just before the contract delivery date. Presumably,
the seller chooses a strategy for bearing the risk of price increases
(and for exploiting its reciprocal rights against the buyer should
the market decline) that maximizes its expected return over a
range of similar contracts.
The risk of market price fluctuations is not the only bench-
mark for evaluating the remedial choices of parties to market con-
tracts. There are also fixed-price contracts whose primary purpose
is to shift the risk of fluctuations in supply.6 7 Many retail sellers
are concerned about inventory management, and retail buyers
want primarily to reserve a claim to a future supply of the goods.
Here, contracts function as an option on the future supply of the
goods at the contract price. This perspective suggests a hypothesis:
to the extent that market contracts are options on the future mar-
ket, then market damages will, in general, better serve the contrac-
tual purposes of the broadest number of bargainers. Market dam-
ages measure the expectancy ex ante, and thus reflect the value of
the option; lost profits, on the other hand, measure losses ex post,
and thus only reflect the value of the completed exchange.
'7 See the discussion of retail volume sales at text accompanying notes 40-52.
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II. THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE DAMAGE RULES
ON MARKET RISKS
In this Part, I examine more precisely the effects of different
damage rules on the allocation of risks in market contracts. The
discussion will show that using the ex post lost profits measure in
cases where there is an available market for the contract goods
results in inefficient and unstable allocations of market risks. If
lost profits are used to limit the risks of market price fluctuations,
the performing party is motivated to adopt an inefficient produc-
tion strategy, while the breaching party is induced to breach op-
portunistically. The resulting instability would motivate most com-
mercial parties either to choose an ex ante market damages
measure in the event of breach or to negotiate explicitly for a more
effective mechanism for limiting damages.
When lost profits are assessed against buyers who cancel con-
tracts with volume sellers, the damage rule has a similarly dis-
torting effect. Because it measures losses ex post, a lost profits
award increases the buyer's liability unpredictably. A contract
term imposing an uncertain penalty on buyers who cancel reduces
the value of the contract to the buyer and inefficiently reduces the
seller's market. Assuming any sizable number of customers value
the privilege of cancellation, most volume sellers of market traded
goods would be motivated to expand their market by providing a
more forgiving, and more certain, cancellation provision. Market
damages best implement this strategy.
A. Lost Profits as a Remedy Limitation
A number of recent cases reflect the trend toward using lost
profits damages to limit market-based recoveries.6 8 To date, how-
ever, there has been no discussion of how commercial parties might
respond to the emerging lost profits rule. Viewed ex ante, the lost
profits rule is an implied contract term that limits the breaching
party's market risk whenever the injured party has laid off a por-
tion of the contractual risk with a third party. The key issue,
therefore, is whether the rule allocates these market risks effi-
ciently. To evaluate this question, consider the facts of Nobs
Chemical in greater detail. Nobs contracted to sell 1,000 metric
tons of cumene to Koppers at a fixed price of $540,000. Nobs ar-
48 See cases cited in note 22.
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ranged to acquire the cumene in Brazil for $400 per ton and to
expend $45 per ton in transportation costs, for a total expense of
$445,000. Koppers breached the contract when the market value of
cumene dropped to around $220 per ton at the time of delivery.
Nobs was able to cancel the Koppers order with its supplier, al-
though it lost its volume discount and had to pay an additional $25
per ton on the balance of its order for other customers. At trial,
therefore, the court confronted the choice between market dam-
ages of $320,000 and the $95,000 profit that, as matters turned out,
the seller would have earned had the buyer accepted delivery and
paid the contract price.69
The argument for limiting market damages to lost profits in
this case is straightforward. Once the seller contracted with the
Brazilian supplier, the shift in market price no longer affected the
seller's costs, and thus an unlimited market damages award no
longer bore any relationship to what would have been the seller's
position had the contract been performed. But, as asserted above,
a fixed-price contract is an option on the future market price. Mar-
ket damages protect the value of the option, not the value of the
completed performance. Thus, the issue turns on which economic
advantage the contract protects. If parties to market contracts bar-
gained over breach terms, would they endorse a lost profits limita-
tion on market damages when the injured party lays off the con-
tract risk with a third party?
The answer depends on the effects of such a limited remedy
provision. In essence, the buyer has the unilateral option, by decid-
ing to breach, to buy the seller's contract rights with the third
party at zero cost. This, in turn, makes the choice of laying off the
contract less valuable to the seller.70 The breaching buyer is a less
attractive co-insurer than the third party supplier because, as the
facts in Nobs Chemical suggest, breach invites the buyer to engage
in strategic maneuvers designed to reallocate the original dontract
risks.71
69 616 F2d at 214.
10 The option to breach also makes the choice of laying off the contract less valuable to
the supplier, thus making it more difficult for the seller to hedge. This result leads to an-
other argument in favor of market damages: most suppliers would presumably insist that
the seller pay over that portion of any damages award that represents the difference be-
tween the supplier's cost and the price of the supply contract. Thus a market damages rule
makes it easier for a seller to cancel its supply contract as well as to enter into it.
1 nly imperfect rules that reflect compromise can establish and enforce the perform-
ance obligations of both parties. Moreover, the parties to executory contracts receive ad-
vance compensation in the form of premiums and discounts to bear any future costs that
may arise. Tensions result when the price of traded goods (such as the cumene in Nobs
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Reallocation of contract risks is inevitable if the seller must
bear uncompensated breach costs. These costs include the
nonreimbursement of attorneys' fees as well as prejudgment inter-
est awards below the market rate of interest.72 The buyer can ex-
ploit the seller's vulnerability to uncompensated costs by increas-
ing the seller's collection costs. The recent cases limiting plaintiffs
to lost profits illustrate this point. In Nobs Chemical the seller had
to pay a $25 per ton premium on cumene ordered for other cus-
tomers as the "price" of cancelling the buyer's order. The buyer
successfully denied responsibility for this sum on the grounds that
it represented unrecompensable consequential damages.7 3
The problem with using lost profits to limit damages lies in
the fact that the limitation applies only when the seller elects to
contract with another supplier before the date of performance. If
the buyer can, at its option, appropriate this contract, the seller
bears the additional costs of dealing with the breaching buyer. Fu-
ture sellers will anticipate these costs and make inefficient adjust-
ments. One alternative is for sellers to increase the price to include
a premium for the "insurance" being provided the buyer through
the lost profits damage rule. But the insurance will cost more than
its value to the buyer because the lost profits rule systematically
skews the seller's incentives. The seller can secure the full benefit
of the opportunity embodied in the fixed-price contract by electing
not to contract with another supplier. The increased costs of deal-
ing with the breaching buyer provide sellers additional incentives
to wait and purchase goods on the spot market shortly before the
date of performance. Whenever this decision is a less efficient
method of production than sharing the risks with another supplier,
the expected value of the contractual relationship is reduced.74
Chemical) changes unexpectedly, giving the adversely affected party a strong incentive to
chisel on his performance obligation. He may evade responsibility by contesting facts, ex-
ploiting arguably ambiguous terms, or refusing to provide full compensation upon breach.
See generally Charles Goetz and Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a Gen-
eral Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va L Rev 967, 977-78 (1983).
72 One can best understand the injured party's dilemma by viewing breach as an invol-
untary loan equal to the amount of the ultimate damage bill. If the amount of the loan and
the costs of credit are difficult to prove, the breaching party will always be able to shift some
of these costs to the non-breacher because the non-breacher's collection costs are not recov-
erable. Thus, the optimal settlement point will always fall below the true damages owed.
71 616 F2d at 216. The court also declined to characterize the $75,000 lost discount as
incidental damages compensable under UCC § 2-710. It held that § 2-710 was intended to
cover only those expenses incurred by the seller after breach and occasioned by the seller's
need to care for and dispose of the breached goods.
71 If the seller were an integrated firm (that is, its own supplier), its damages would
equal market damages. If the seller were not integrated, it presumably could allocate part of
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The Nobs Chemical rule also encourages inefficient behavioral
adjustments by the breaching buyer. Ideally, the buyer should
breach only when it determines that the seller is better able to sal-
vage the broken contract (such as by reselling the goods on the
market). The decision to breach rather than perform and bear the
resulting losses internally represents the buyer's cry for help: a re-
quest that the seller salvage the broken contract and send the
buyer the damage bill. Viewed expectationally, both parties would
prefer that the buyer only breach when it believes that the seller
enjoys such an advantage. By deterring breach except when the
seller has the comparative advantage in salvaging the contract, the
parties can reduce the joint costs of bearing market risks, thus en-
hancing the value of the contractual opportunity for both. 5 The
unfortunate effect of the Nobs Chemical rule is to encourage buy-
ers to breach opportunistically. Only by breaching can a buyer cap-
ture the benefits of the third party contract and share a portion of
the resulting market advantage. Predictably, some buyers will
breach in order to obtain the insurance benefits of the damage rule
even in instances where (but for the damage limitation) the buyers
enjoy the comparative advantage in minimizing the costs of salvag-
ing the now regretted contract.
The rule limiting damages to lost profits creates instability. In
a case such as Nobs Chemical, most sellers would prefer to supply
a product that does not include an inefficient type of insurance,
one that requires buyers to know a lot about the production pro-
cess in order to determine whether they are getting their money's
worth. The analysis applies with equal force to the analogous cases
where plaintiff buyers who have contracted to resell to third par-
ties have recovered only lost profits damages in actions against
breaching sellers.76 In either case, the lost profits rule gives the
breacher serendipitous reductions in the risk of price fluctuations.
But it is hard to price those reductions ex ante. The serendipitous
quality has a distorting effect on how the non-breacher bears risks
which, in turn, causes unnecessary increases in production costs.
its own damages from the buyer to compensate the supplier for the supplier's loss. The lost
profits argument overlooks the possibility of a separate bargain between the supplier and
the seller. An important point follows: lost profits damages punish the seller for not being an
integrated firm, and consequently deter efficient out-sourcing of supply.
75 See Robert E. Scott and Douglas L. Leslie, Contract Law and Theory 723-26
(Michie, 1988).
76 See Allied Canners, 209 Cal Rptr 60, H-W-H Cattle Co., 767 F2d 437, and discussion
of buyers' breaches in text accompanying notes 6-11.
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Why, then, should we assume that the market damages rem-
edy encourages superior decisions about how to bear the risk of
price fluctuations? The answer lies in the parties' enhanced ability
to evaluate the price of "the product" at the time of contract, and
their ability thereafter to select production strategies irrespective
of the prospect of the other's breach. Whenever a significant moti-
vation for a fixed-price contract is to allocate the risk of price fluc-
tuations, a market damages measure will induce more efficient
risk-bearing behavior by the non-breaching party. A lost profits
rule cannot retain these efficiencies. The reason is simple. Under a
lost profits rule, there are two different contracts being offered for
the same price. In one, a breacher's liability is limited (where the
seller lays off the contract with a third party). In the other, it is
not (where the seller produces the goods itself or acquires them on
the spot market). The lost profits rule is not an equilibrium con-
tract term because the rule treats these two contracts as equivalent
when, in fact, they are not.
Once one visualizes a product as a combination of the goods
plus certain legal rights and remedies, it makes no sense to think
that parties would prefer a product (the damage limitation) whose
value depends on conditions they are unable to observe except at
great cost. The argument for limiting damages to lost profits seeks
to measure damages by comparing the product before the judicial
decision with the same product after the new damage rule is an-
nounced. The flaw in the analysis is that if the lost profits remedy
were known in advance, it would change the price at which the
product was sold. When the principal product is the sale of an op-
tion on the futures market, parties will prefer a damage measure
that fixes the means of valuing the option at the time of contract
to one that determines the value of the bargain at the time of
performance.
B. Rethinking the Lost Volume Problem: Lost Profits as a
Cancellation Penalty
Consider now the paradigmatic lost volume case in which eco-
nomic loss may systematically exceed the traditional market dam-
ages award. Whether the award of traditional market damages will
be "inadequate" depends on many complex factors. But the dis-
cussion above illustrates several clarifying points. First, it is virtu-
ally impossible to know when a seller has lost actual volume be-
cause of a breach. Sellers who react to changes in demand by
adjusting prices will typically be able to replace contract losses on
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the spot market.77 Volume sellers who use the fishing model of
business conduct (putting out a predetermined quantity of inven-
tory at a fixed price) will lose an anticipated sale because of the
breach. However, under these selling conditions, the breaching
buyer can plausibly claim that the sale would have been lost even
had the buyer performed and thereafter resold the goods to a po-
tential customer of the seller.78 In either case, therefore, the
buyer's choice to perform or breach will not affect the seller's ac-
tual volume.
In short, the focus on lost volume is a red herring. What both
sellers "lose" is an expected volume (at an expected price) deter-
mined as of the time of contract. The issue, then, is to determine
the economic loss attributable to that lost expectancy. This loss
will in all cases be equal to the fluctuation in market price together
with any of the selling costs attributable to the breached contract.
Traditional market damages will inadequately protect the
seller's expectancy in some cases. The distortion does not result
from the inadequacy of the market measure per se, but from the
tendency of courts to limit incidental damages to the seller's post-
breach reliance costs.79 This limitation is appropriate for the pro-
7 The seller can resell on the spot market whenever he fishes for spot purchases indi-
vidually by adjusting the price at which the goods are offered for sale. See Cooter and Eisen-
berg, 73 Cal L Rev at 1451-55 (cited in note 11). The resale opportunity does not depend on
whether the seller is operating under conditions of increasing marginal costs. (The marginal
costs savings, if any, merely affect the amount of offset to be applied against the contract
price/resale price differential.) The seller may recover such reselling costs as incidental dam-
ages. "[C]osts otherwise resulting from the breach" under UCC § 2-710 should also include
any price reductions on other spot sales stemming from an inability to price-discriminate.
However, the courts may not allow such costs under traditional interpretations of UCC § 2-
710. If they do not, then a market damages award will not fully compensate this seller for
his economic loss.
" The fishing model assumes that the seller engages in predetermined selling efforts to
catch a given number of buyers at a fixed price. Assume that a seller sets out inventory
sufficient to catch 20 buyers. After negotiating a contract for one unit, the defendant buyer
decides that he no longer wants the contract goods. At this point, the buyer can "perform"
by accepting delivery, paying the contract price, and then offering the goods to a potential
customer of the seller. Alternatively, the buyer can breach and pay the seller to resell for
him. Although the parties may well have different salvaging costs, the seller's actual sales
volume in both cases is 19 units.
If the seller operates in a thick market (one with many buyers and sellers), it is more
difficult for a buyer to argue that the resale customer would have purchased from the plain-
tiff seller. However, in such a case the fishing model becomes as implausible as the seller's
claim that he could not resell the breached goods to another buyer.
79 Section 2-710 of the UCC defines incidental damages as "any commercially reasona-
ble charges, expenses or commissions incurred in... connection with return or resale of the
goods or otherwise resulting from the breach." The official comment to § 2-710 reinforces
the drafters' purpose to reimburse "expenses reasonably incurred [by a seller] as a result of
the buyer's breach."
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totypical fixed-price contract, such as that found in Nobs Chemi-
cal, whose primary purpose is to allocate the risk of market shifts.
But certain fixed-price contracts-such as the retail sale of stan-
dard-priced goods-only incidentally allocate market shifts.80
Their primary function is to reserve for the consumer a place in a
limited queue. In this case, more of the seller's costs go to "main-
tain the queue." Such a seller should recover not only the market
shift, but also incidental damages equal to the amortized portion
of the total selling costs consumed in fishing for buyers in the rele-
vant period. 1
The familiar case of Neri v Retail Marine Corp." provides a
useful framework for reexamining the lost volume problem. Retail
Marine, a dealer in marine equipment and supplies, contracted to
sell a new boat to Neri for $12,500. Marine then ordered and re-
ceived the boat from its supplier. Six days after the agreement
Neri breached. Four months later, Marine sold the boat to another
buyer for the same price. When Neri sued to recover his down pay-
ment, Marine counterclaimed for lost profits of $2,500 under UCC
§ 2-708(2), arguing that absent Neri's default it would have earned
two profits rather than one. The New York Court of Appeals sus-
tained Marine's lost volume claim, holding that "[t]he conclusion
is clear from the record-indeed with mathematical cer-
tainty-that '[market damages are] inadequate to put the seller in
as good a position as performance'.., and hence.., the seller is
entitled to its [profit] .... "83
Most courts have interpreted this provision narrowly, to "cover only those expenses
incurred by the seller after the breach." Nobs Chemical, 616 F2d at 216. See also Neri v
Retail Marine Corp., 30 NY2d 393, 285 NE2d 311, 315 (1972); Harlow & Jones, Inc. v Ad-
vance Steel Co., 424 F Supp 770, 778 (E D Mich 1976). Therefore, courts generally do not
award post-contract reliance costs, even where the breach enhances them. See Industrial
Circuits Co. v Terminal Communications, Inc., 26 NC App 536, 216 SE2d 919, 922 (1975)
("bill back" charges which resulted when buyer failed to order a certain quantity not
allowed).
"0 The market price of durable goods does not fluctuate substantially, at least not over
the short period of retail purchase agreements.
81 Similarly, a seller who must adjust prices on all its spot sales in order to resell the
contract goods should properly recover the price discounts as incidental damages.
In theory, the breacher should pay all the marginal selling costs that the business in-
curred expectationally in dealing with him. This point is the link to the frequent discussion
in the lost volume cases of the seller's unused capacity. The breacher is properly responsible
for all the capacity-enhancing costs attributable to the broken contract. As long as the
breaching buyer pays his fair share of overhead expenses, the seller should be indifferent.
But courts have traditionally allowed only out-of-pocket reliance costs, rather than expected
reliance costs.
82 30 NY2d 393, 285 NE2d 311 (1972).
8" Id at 314 (quoting UCC § 2-708(2)).
1990]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Much commentary has addressed the question of whether the
Neri rule accurately measures the damages suffered by lost volume
sellers."' I focus instead on the more fundamental question: what
damage rule would more parties prefer?
The impetus for lost profits damages derives from the realiza-
tion that market damages may not fully compensate the volume
seller for its lost expectancy. Unless courts allow such sellers to
recover selling costs consumed by the breacher in negotiating the
contract, an award of market damages will be inadequate. The key
to understanding the lost volume problem lies in the realization
that lost profit awards err in the opposite direction. Consider the
actions of sellers such as Retail Marine. If Retail Marine follows
the fishing model of business conduct, it sets out a predetermined
inventory of boats, invests in a preset level of selling activity, and
hopes to generate X volume of sales over the relevant period. Ex-
perience also teaches Retail Marine that some statistically proba-
ble number of buyers (Y) will change their minds and either
breach or resell the goods. The seller's expectation following a con-
tract with any buyer takes into account this probability. The
seller's market is not total contracts (X), but rather total contracts
less those buyers who change their minds (X minus Y). Since the
court bases lost profits damages on its estimate of total contracts,
the award provides more than the seller expects.
Consider again Goldberg's argument that since the gross mar-
gin of a retail seller in a competitive market will be expended in
selling efforts, lost profits are a useful proxy for nonsalvageable
selling costs. This argument conflates expected reliance on total
contracts obtained with expected reliance on total sales completed.
It is true that the "fishing" costs of getting buyers "on the hook"
are consumed and thus nonsalvageable, but these costs do not
equal the entire margin between wholesale price and contract
price. If total sales are less than total contracts, then activities nec-
essary to complete the sale eat up some portion of the seller's mar-
gin. These "completion" costs-such as delivery and product prep-
aration-are incurred only for buyers who actually go through with
the deal. Anticipating this probability, the seller will reduce its in-
vestment in contract completion. Furthermore, in addition to mar-
ginal "completion" costs, the non-marginal or fixed overhead
costs-such as the building-are also not properly attributed to
the breaching buyer because he does not consume or exhaust that
84 See sources cited in notes 9, 11, and 13.
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resource. A lost profits award will thus overcompensate the volume
seller because the buyer's breach does not consume significant re-
tailing costs.8 5
Recognizing that both alternatives deviate from the ideal clari-
fies the function of the damage rule in contracts with volume sell-
ers. Market damages and lost profits provide alternative mecha-
nisms for allocating the risk of cancellation. Suppose a seller
decides to market a product for which many consumers are likely
to change their minds before delivery. The seller can choose either
to market the product at a high price with a lenient cancellation
policy, or at a lower price with a harsher cancellation policy.8 Mar-
ket damages implement the former choice. The right of cancella-
tion reflected in the market damages rule functions as an insurance
policy purchased by the buyer as part of the contractual product.
A lost profits rule, on the other hand, functions as a cancella-
tion penalty, increasing the costs and thus reducing the risk of
breach. Obviously, at the time of performance, all sellers would
prefer additional security against buyers' breaches. But contractual
security must also be written into the contract, either expressly or
by implication. A change in the damage rule from market damages
to lost profits reduces the value of the contractual product because
it increases the costs for buyers who wish to cancel the contract.
Reducing product quality leads, in turn, to either a reduction in
price or a reduction in the seller's market. One cannot determine a
priori whether such a change would maximize profits. Common ob-
servation tells us that in many industries, sellers offer a product
that includes a right of cancellation or return. In others, security
deposits are commonplace. But this reconceptualization does invite
a more careful examination of the relevant issue in lost volume
cases: how would parties allocate the risk of cancellation?
Suppose that Retail Marine must choose between two con-
tracts for marketing its boats: Contract A, with a potentially un-
dercompensatory market damages rule, or Contract B, specifying
full recovery of overcompensatory lost profits. Assume further that
Retail Marine operates under the following market conditions: (1)
a thick market with many sellers;87 (2) some consumers who value
"' In our earlier article, Goetz and I assumed unrealistically that the seller's overhead
includes no marginal costs. Equally implausibly, Goldberg assumes that the seller dedicates
all overhead costs to marginal selling efforts. Health spas provide a good example of a retail
industry with high fixed and completion costs relative to selling costs.
86 The airline industry, which typically pairs a high fare with a lax cancellation policy
and a low fare with a stringent one, offers a good example of this approach.
" This condition encompasses both perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive
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the right to cancel the contract at its cost to Marine;'5 and (3)
unexploited economies of scale in its production function. Contract
A, with a more attractive right of cancellation (the market dam-
ages rule), permits Marine to increase its market by offering to sell
goods to consumers who value the right to change their minds.
Contract A increases the average volume of sales at any particular
price. Marine is thus able to amortize its fixed costs over more con-
sumers. This lowers Marine's average total costs and its price for
everybody, those who exercise the cancellation privilege and those
who do not. So long as the reductions in price are greater than the
incremental costs of the market damages rule (the marginal costs
of selling to additional buyers and the uncompensated selling costs
for those buyers who breach), Contract A, with the more attractive
cancellation feature, provides an unambiguous benefit for the par-
ties to share.
Moreover, Marine would probably prefer to market its boats
under Contract A even if it operated as a price monopolist in a
thin market with few sellers. As a price monopolist, Marine can
find its profit-maximizing quantity by adjusting price rather than
product attributes. The monopolist need not sell cancellation in-
surance to attract the profit-maximizing number of consumers.
Marine would still prefer Contract A because, as a monopolist,
Marine prefers not to have a competitor who will "spoil" its mar-
ket. The harsh cancellation policy induces a buyer who changes his
mind nevertheless to accept delivery and then resell the contract
goods.
A thin market with few sellers is the most plausible environ-
ment for a buyer to capture another customer of the seller. Con-
tract B magnifies this market spoilage effect because a lost profits
rule encourages inefficient self-help salvage decisions by buyers.
The lost profits rule motivates the buyer to take delivery and then
resell whenever the selling costs are less than the lost profits the
buyer would otherwise have to pay. This incentive remains even
markets, including spatial monopolies of the kind typically associated with retail sales of
brand-name products.
" The problem of lost volume is analogous to any problem of the joint production of
goods. People who want to change their minds are buying one product, and people who
don't are buying a different product. The right of cancellation should, therefore, sell at cost
in a competitive market. Thus, where there are fixed overhead costs but no marginal over-
head costs (as with a retailer opening up a store), it costs nothing to provide the privilege of
cancellation or return. In equilibrium, such a market will still generate a positive wholesale/
retail spread because the retailer must recover all the fixed costs (including the store open-
ing) from consumers. But to award those costs as damages against a cancelling buyer would
be a penalty.
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where the seller could salvage the now regretted contract at less
cost.' 9 Moreover, the prospect of obtaining a lost profits recovery
will skew the seller's salvaging incentives. If a buyer breaches
under Contract B, the seller is motivated by the prospect of lost
profits damages to hold the goods in inventory until the next fish-
ing period even where an unanticipated resale opportunity materi-
alizes.90 The overcompensatory lost profits rule thus makes both
buyer and seller worse off and reduces the expected value of the
contract.
In sum, under plausible assumptions, most volume sellers in a
competitive environment would prefer a market damages default
rule because this rule permits a seller to expand its volume and
lower its price. A volume seller who operates as a price monopolist
would still prefer the market damages rule because the monopolist
prefers not to have a competitive fringe. To be sure, the desirabil-
ity of packaging the retail product with a right of cancellation de-
pends on the presence of consumers who would pay for the cancel-
lation privilege. Nevertheless, the evidence of customary rights of
cancellation in many environments suggests that these empirical
conditions are common.9 1
In retrospect, the lost volume story can be understood perhaps
as a predictable reaction to changes in retailing practices through-
out the twentieth century. When common law courts applying a
An example will illustrate the inefficiency of lost profits as a rule for directing salvage
decisions. Assume Seller can prove estimated profits on total contracts of $2,000 per con-
tract. The "profit" consists of $1,000 in expected marginal selling costs, $500 in amortized
fixed costs, and $500 in expected marginal "completion" costs. Should Buyer resell himself,
his salvaging costs are $2,250. If buyer were to breach under a lost profits rule, Seller would
recover lost profits of $2,000, plus $500 in out-of-pocket completion costs as recoverable
incidental damages. Absent renegotiation of the inefficient damage rule, Buyer will choose
instead to perform and resell for $2,250 even though both parties would be better off if
Seller were to agree to salvage the contract for $1,500 (its total marginal expenditures in
reselling).
"0 It would be nearly impossible for a buyer to rebut the seller's prima facie case for lost
profits even when the breaching buyer did not fully consume the seller's gross margin. A lost
profits award to a volume seller undermines the mitigation principle. It reduces the value of
the contractual opportunity for both parties, because a buyer who anticipates bearing excess
costs will presumably negotiate for a more costly return promise to compensate for these
inflated costs. Both parties benefit if they agree in advance to provisions that reduce ex-
pected future costs. See Goetz and Scott, 69 Va L Rev at 972-73 (cited in note 71).
" The optimal strategy for a boat seller such as Retail Marine may be to segment the
market, by selling some boats without a lost profits contract (that is, with no penalty for
cancellation) for a higher price and others with a market damages rule for a lower price. If
this strategy is sometimes optimal, it supports the general preference for market damages as
the background rule, because the market damages rule offers parties the cheaper route of
opting out with a fixed fee deposit rather than custom designing a contract for buyers who
value the right to cancel. See note 88.
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market damages rule did not recognize the pre-breach selling ex-
penses that retail sellers incur, they denied such sellers the ful
benefit of their bargain. Those selling costs became fixed in antici-
pation of the seller making X plus 1 sales, and could not be saved
if instead the seller only made X sales. Moreover, it is plausible to
assume that more selling costs became fixed as retail practices
changed, particularly through use of increasingly large inventories.
At some point, courts and commentators translated this intuition
into "volume" as the means of distributing overhead. In fact, the
volume seller does not lose a sale; rather, he loses the costs of
hooking a prospect.
Understanding how the analysis evolved also leads to a
sharper understanding of how it went astray. The error in the con-
ventional lost volume argument is the assumption that the seller's
expected volume equals the total number of contracts rather than
the number reflecting expected cancellations and buyers' resales.
The seller is thus overcompensated if a lost profits award enforces,
after the fact, the contracted-for volume without adjusting for buy-
ers' resales and buyers' returns. Focusing on expected volume tells
us that as long as the buyer pays his fair share of the overhead
expenses, the seller would be indifferent if the buyer exercised a
cancellation privilege. In general, an ex ante damage measure will
better approximate the value of that expectancy than will the ex
post perspective of a lost profits award.
III. MEASURING DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF MARKET CONTRACTS
The preceding discussion supports the common law preference
for market damages when an available market for the contract
goods exists. A market damages award is a superior default rule
even when it deviates from ex post economic losses. In those in-
stances, the market damages rule functions expectationally, guar-
anteeing the injured party the value of the other's performance as
measured from the time of contract. In this Part, I examine
whether the case for market damages can be harmonized with the
remedial scheme of the Uniform Commercial Code.
A. The Relationship Between the Risk Allocating and the
Measurement Functions of Damage Rules
One must define the bargain before selecting among alterna-
tive rules for measuring the loss of bargain. When market damages
and lost profits diverge ex post, they are not alternatives. Rather,
they are functionally different contract terms with different risk
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implications. The two mechanisms do not diverge, however, when
the injured party can transform its internal costs and revenues by
either purchasing or selling contract goods on the market at or af-
ter the time for performance. If the injured party's post-contract
actions do not affect access to the market, ex ante losses equal ex
post losses. Thus, from either perspective the injured party ends
up in the same economic position he would have enjoyed had the
goods been accepted and paid for.92 This case offers no a priori
reason to prefer one alternative over the other. Rather, the choice
among equivalents turns on a systemic question: which of these
measures minimizes the costs of enforcing market contracts?
Two factors determine enforcement costs: the litigation costs
of proving actual losses, and the error costs of selecting a damages
measure that imprecisely mirrors the underlying objective of full
performance compensation." A procedurally optimal measure of
damages minimizes the sum of these two costs. In other words, the
most efficient damages measure offers the cost-minimizing balance
between clarity and accuracy. This perspective reveals the error in
condemning market damages because the rule only measures the
expectancy indirectly, while lost profits do so precisely.94 In the
case of lost profits, increased litigation costs offset the theoretical
accuracy of the measure. Lost profits awards require proof of many
facts concerning the nature of the seller's cost and market condi-
tions. Obtaining these facts can be extremely costly. Thus, the
greater litigation costs of proving lost profits will often exceed the
approximation of economic losses achieved by using easily verifi-
able market equivalents.9 5
92 The injured party receives "lost profits" in every case. The risk allocation question,
then, is whether to determine those lost profits ex ante, at the time of contract, or ex post,
at the time of breach. If market transformation is feasible at the time of breach, the only
question is one of measurement. If the plaintiff seller resells the contract goods on the mar-
ket, then the sum of the market price, the market damages, and the seller's cost will equal
the profits lost by the breach. Alternatively, the seller can establish the identical loss by
showing the changes in estimated costs and revenues caused by the breach.
'3 The clearer the substantive damage rule, the easier it is to enforce. The primary cost
of a clear rule is that it may only imperfectly capture the underlying objective. See Goetz
and Scott, 89 Yale L J at 1290-91 (cited in note 3). Compare Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J Legal Stud 257, 267-71 (1974)
(explaining how precise rules generate costs of overinclusion and underinclusion).
" See Childres, 72 Nw U L Rev at 837 (cited in note 9).
'5 Among the many difficulties of using lost profits measures accurately is the tendency
of courts to accept average cost data as the basis for estimating lost profits. See, for exam-
ple, American Metal Climax, Inc. v Essex International, Inc., 16 UCC Rep 101, 115 (S D
NY 1974). Whenever the seller's marginal costs are increasing, average cost data is inaccu-
rate. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Goetz and Scott, 31 Stan L Rev at 358-64
(cited in note 13).
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B. Measuring Damages Under the Uniform Commercial Code
While the UCC has abandoned the available market test of
the common law, the drafters did retain a strong preference for
market damages, a preference largely ignored in the recent debate
over lost profits.
1. Seller's damages under the Code.
a) Seller's market damages. Assume a buyer repudiates a
fixed-price contract to purchase goods and the seller sues for dam-
ages. How should the seller's damages be measured? The UCC's
compensation principle requires that the seller receive damages
sufficient to place it in as good a position as if the buyer had fully
performed.96 However, as we have seen, the full performance com-
pensation principle disguises a fundamental ambiguity: is the con-
tractual expectancy to be determined ex ante, at the time of con-
tract, or ex post, at the time for performance? The UCC does not
resolve the ambiguity explicitly. Nevertheless, the recent enthusi-
asm of courts and commentators for lost profits overlooks the
UCC's retention of the common law preference for market
damages.
The UCC provides the seller two alternative methods for
measuring losses by market damages.9 The seller can resell the
goods under § 2-706 and use the resale price to establish the price
shift from the time of contract.9 8 Alternatively, the seller may pro-
ceed under § 2-708(1) and establish the price fluctuations by proof
of the market price at the time and place of performance.99 What
would induce the seller to choose one measure over another? By
reselling under § 2-706, the seller can fix the price differential with
certainty, thus avoiding the proof problems of establishing the rel-
evant market price. The seller's "proof" under § 2-706 is the con-
tract price and the resale price, minimizing litigation costs.
96 UCC § 1-106.
' The UCC recognizes that because damages may be difficult to prove, breach may
impose losses that exceed compensatory damages. Thus, the UCC provides the aggrieved
seller with flexibility in responding to the buyer's breach. The seller enjoys an advantage in
selecting the remedy that will minimize breach costs. In turn, the injured party's obligation
to mitigate damages helps ensure efficient salvage responses.
11 Section 2-706 of the UCC provides that if the seller resells the goods in good faith
and in a commercially reasonable manner, it is entitled to measure loss by the difference
between the contract and resale prices.
-- UCC § 2-708(1). Theoretically this measure parallels § 2-706 by identifying what a
resale would have brought had the seller elected to resell in the market.
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But this advantage does carry other costs. To establish market
damages by resale, the seller must comply with a number of spe-
cific conditions.100 It may well be that the uncompensated costs
(lost business opportunities) imposed by compliance with a regu-
lated resale are greater than any advantage in reducing anticipated
litigation costs. Thus, the UCC offers the seller the alternative of
reselling without supervision and instead relying on independent
evidence of the market price to establish damages.10 1 This option
permits a seller to return goods to inventory, rather than promptly
reselling them, and to recover damages based on a hypothetical
resale.
Several commentators have criticized the option under § 2-
708(1) of establishing the market fluctuation by proving market
price. Professor Childres advanced the argument, for example, that
a seller should be compelled to resell under § 2-706.102 He argued
that resale is the only accurate measure of a given seller's market
alternatives because the § 2-708(1) mechanism relies on a hypo-
thetical market sale. But gains in accuracy are not socially desira-
ble if purchased at the price of even greater uncompensated breach
costs. Requiring resale in all cases invites strategic behavior by the
breaching buyer, who is motivated to challenge the seller's compli-
ance with the more complex statutory requirements of § 2-706.
Furthermore, the tradeoff between the more accurate but complex
option of § 2-706 and the clear but crude alternative of § 2-708(1)
will vary in particular cases. The injured seller bears all the un-
compensated costs, and has ample motivation to select whichever
option minimizes its potential exposure. Thus, providing a choice
to the party who suffers the consequences of any miscalculation
reduces the costs of enforcing market damage rules.
Professors White and Summers are also troubled by the fact
that the UCC may not preclude a seller from seeking recovery
under § 2-708(1), even when the seller has resold the goods in a
manner that suggests that recovery was available under the resale
provisions of § 2-706.103 Assume that Buyer breaches a contract for
100 Section 2-706(2) permits the resale by either private or public auction. Both types of
resale require reasonable notification to the buyer and must be "reasonably identified" as
referring to the broken contract. The public sale imposes additional conditions.
101 Section 2-723(2) moderates the difficulty in establishing market price at the time
and place of tender. Upon notice to the other party, the injured party may introduce evi-
dence of the price prevailing within a reasonable time before or after the time of tender or
at any other place which could serve as a reasonable substitute.
102 Childres, 72 Nw U L Rev at 837 (cited in note 9).
101 White and Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code § 7-7 at 351-52 (cited in note 9).
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$10,000. Resale occurs in Seller's local market without formal noti-
fication to Buyer and brings $8,000. Assume also that Seller can
establish that the market price at the time and place of tender
(Seller's market) was $7,000. Under these conditions, allowing
Seller to recover $3,000 market damages under § 2-708(1) appears
to provide a windfall gain of $1,000. In such a case, White and
Summers argue, the full performance compensation principle (em-
bodied in § 1-106) demands that Seller be limited to its $2,000 re-
covery under § 2-706.10"
Visualizing these damage alternatives from the ex ante per-
spective demonstrates why Seller's recovery of $3,000 market dam-
ages is not a windfall gain. A market contract does not purport to
reflect ex post circumstances. Rather, it protects the parties' ex
ante expectancy. At the time of breach, Seller cannot systemati-
cally predict which market alternative (if any) will yield the
greater recovery. In theory, these are equivalent measures; over
time, arbitrage will generate a uniform market price. Thus, the
Seller's expected recovery in either case is exactly the same. Seller
cannot outguess the market consistently, so it will select whichever
option minimizes breach costs-which is exactly what the parties
would bargain for.'0 5 Even if Seller's actions result in an ex post
windfall gain in a particular case, the gain should belong to the
Seller because it also bears the risk of an unfavorable resale. If, for
example, Seller was only able to resell for $6,000, it would suffer
$1,000 in uncompensated costs. Because the specific conditions of §
2-706 would not be satisfied, § 2-708(1) would limit recovery to the
$3,000 shift in the market price.
An ex post perspective on market damages is not only mis-
guided in theory, but contravenes the letter of the statute and the
policy underlying the UCC's treatment of damages. The UCC em-
phasizes the primacy of market damages for market contracts and
the correlative right to choose among alternative methods of meas-
uring that loss. 0 6 At least on an intuitive level, the drafters
seemed to understand that an ex ante approach to damage meas-
104 Id at 352.
10. This argument first appeared in Thomas H. Jackson, "Anticipatory Repudiation"
and the Temporal Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages
In Cases of Prospective Non-Performance, 31 Stan L Rev 69, 110, 115-16 (1978).
Ill Under UCO § 2-703, the seller may either resell pursuant to § 2-706 or prove market
prices under § 2-708(1). Comment 1 to § 2-703 emphasizes that "this Article rejects any
doctrine of election of remedy as a fundamental policy and thus the remedies are essentially
cumulative in nature and include all of the available remedies for breach." See also UCC §
2-706, Comment 2.
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urement furthers the contractual purposes of the parties. The
choice between § 2-706 and § 2-708(1) is an important part of effi-
cacious enforcement against a breacher tempted to evade its con-
tractual responsibility. In turn, assuring a seller that it will be able
to enforce the contractual damage rule at reasonable cost protects
the favorable market shift that was purchased with the fixed price
contract.
b) Lost profits. When may the seller use the UCC's lost
profits measure instead of the market damages alternatives? The
common law focused on the absence of an available market. Where
there was no available market for the goods, the common law (and
the various sales acts) departed from the requirement that the
seller replace the breached contract by reselling the contract goods.
While the UCC no longer uses the available market formulation, it
plainly directs the same result. Thus, the seller of special order
goods (where presumably there is a thin resale market) can either
complete performance and recover the full purchase price,0 7 or
discontinue an incomplete performance and recover its estimated
profits by establishing through direct proof the changes in reve-
nues and costs caused by the breach. 08 The UCC makes lost prof-
its available whenever market damages are "inadequate to put the
seller in as good a position as performance would have
done. . ."'09 The seller clearly merits lost profits under this pro-
vision when, after breach, he chooses to cease production and sal-
vage the components of specially manufactured goods." 0 The con-
107 Under UCC § 2-709(1)(b) the seller can recover the purchase price of identified
goods if it is "unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price. .. ."
Courts have generally held that § 2-709(1)(b) applies when there is no ready or available
market for the goods. See, for example, Cole v Melvin, 441 F Supp 193, 205 n 7 (D SD
1977). Courts permit an action for the price in such cases because they doubt the fundamen-
tal assumption of market damages-that the seller can generally resell the goods more effi-
ciently because selling is his business. Moreover, not only resale costs result from a breach.
The seller's risk of uncompensated breach costs is greater whenever the market is too thin
to provide reliable evidence of comparable prices. See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott,
Sales Law and the Contracting Process 355-63 (Foundation, 2d ed 1990).
108 UCC § 2-704(2) permits a seller exercising reasonable commercial judgment to ter-
minate production and salvage its components. See Goetz and Scott, 31 Stan L Rev at 358-
61 (cited in note 13). See also cases cited in note 110.
109 UCC § 2-708(2).
110 See, for example, Timber Access Industries Co. v U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers,
Inc., 263 Or 509, 503 P2d 482, 489-91 (1972); Chicago Roller Skate Mfg. Co., Inc. v Sokol
Mfg. Co., 185 Neb 515, 177 NW2d 25, 27 (1970); Autonumerics, Inc. v Bayer Industries,
Inc., 144 Ariz 181, 696 P2d 1330, 1340 (App 1984). See also Neumiller Farms, Inc. v
Cornett, 368 S2d 272, 275 (Ala 1979) ("It is implicit within [§ 2-708], that, in order to em-
ploy the damage formula of subsection (1), there must not only exist a market for the con-
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troversial issue is whether the UCC expands access to lost profits.
The UCC drafters failed to specify more precisely when the award
of lost profits is appropriate, but both the Comments and legisla-
tive history reveal that their uncertainty stemmed from cases
granting lost profit awards to volume sellers (generally retailers or
jobbers) who thought market damages undercompensatory.
c) Solving the lost volume problem under the UCC. The
lost volume problem clearly remains vexing. I have argued that the
optimal damage rule would compensate the plaintiff seller for any
market price shift as well as for the selling efforts "consumed" in
the effort to secure the breached contract.' Under the optimal
default rule, therefore, damages would be less than the estimated
profits per contract (the recovery presumptively available under
§ 2-708(2)), but more than market damages plus post-breach inci-
dental expenses (the recovery presumptively available under §§ 2-
708(1) and 2-710). The challenge is to find a consistent interpreta-
tion of the various UCC provisions that better approximates the
optimal default rule for lost volume cases.
Many courts and commentators would permit lost volume sell-
ers to seek damages under § 2-708(2). This approach appears con-
sistent with the statutory language and with the drafters' apparent
belief that volume sales require careful attention to the position
the seller would have achieved upon performance. But, as the dis-
cussion above has shown, a lost profits rule in lost volume claims
invites excessively large awards."' The award of lost profits is not
a good proxy for the lost selling efforts. A significant portion of
those "profits" covers sale completion costs and fixed overhead
that the breaching buyer does not consume." 3 Thus, recovery
under § 2-708(2) of "the profit (including reasonable overhead)
which the seller would have made from full performance" will al-
ways exact a cancellation penalty from the buyer in a sum greater
than most parties would have stipulated had they bargained over
tracted goods, but also the aggrieved seller must have a legal obligation to enter that market
to avoid the foreseeable adverse consequences of ... breach. Unless there is a market...
the subsection (1) measure of damages is functionally inadequate and the aggrieved seller
may seek redress through ... subsection (2).").
... See text following note 91.
"' Because performance, by definition, never occurs, what would have happened is al-
ways a matter of conjecture. Seller can never in fact show that the breach caused the "loss"
of a sale. But the breach does cause Seller to suffer uncompensated selling costs.
13 In the fishing model, sellers intent on enlarging their market would not charge the
fish that got away with the costs of cleaning the catch or with the amortized cost of the
fishing boat. See text accompanying notes 84-85.
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the issue in advance.114 Moreover, § 2-708(2) specifies, in addition,
that seller is entitled to "any incidental damages [under § 2-710]."
Because the selling costs recovered under the guise of lost profits
include post-breach and post-contract selling activities, this lan-
guage specifically invites courts to grant sellers a double recovery
for post-breach incidental costs.
Permitting recovery of lost profits for volume sellers under §
2-708(2) thus places on the retail buyer (often a consumer) the
daunting burden of establishing the amount by which the esti-
mated profits exceed the actual selling costs consumed in securing
the breached contract. Viewed simply as a question of procedural
efficiency, this outcome seems perverse. The plaintiff-seller enjoys
the comparative advantage in assembling and presenting evidence
of the selling costs attributable to the breach. A default rule that
shifts the burden to the buyer both increases the costs and reduces
the accuracy of legal enforcement. Indeed, it is likely that expected
enforcement costs will exceed any anticipated returns from litigat-
ing the accuracy of an award under § 2-708(2). If so, the ultimate
effect of using § 2-708(2) to compensate lost volume sellers will be
to institutionalize a severe and socially wasteful cancellation pol-
icy. First, a lost profits rule gives most sellers more protection
against cancellation than they could plausibly want."5 Second, the
amount of the insurance coverage is based on factors (such as
seller's costs) that buyers cannot determine except at great cost.
The resulting uncertainty degrades product quality with no benefit
accruing to either party."'
Consider the alternative rule: volume sellers receive market
damages under § 2-706 or § 2-708(1) together with incidental dam-
ages under § 2-710. The recovery of any shift in the market price
between contract and delivery is not problematic. The issue turns
solely on the calculation of incidental damages. Recall that the vol-
ume seller's expectancy upon signing the contract is the opportu-
114 See text accompanying notes 88-92.
,, See text accompanying notes 86-91.
' Two sources provide ad hoc evidence of the inefficiency of a lost profits rule for
volume sellers. One source is the infrequency of litigation over lost profits awards. See Goetz
and Scott, 31 Stan L Rev at 323, 351 n 65 (cited in note 13). The other is the prevalence of
liberal policies among retailers on cancellations and returns. Retail volume sellers who do
sue breaching buyers usually ask nothing more than market damages plus incidental ex-
penses, despite the widely publicized recoveries in cases such as Neri. See cases cited in note
117. These sources suggest that most parties either opt out of the lost profits rule and stipu-
late a cancellation fee, often a nonrefundable deposit, or bargain after breach for some re-
laxation of the lost profits rule. The current preference for lost profits generates these so-
cially wasteful bargaining costs.
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nity to complete the deal at the time of performance. Performance
would have earned seller that opportunity; breach has foreclosed
it. To satisfy the full performance compensation principle, seller
must receive damages equal to the lost contractual opportunity.
The value of the foregone opportunity, however, is not measured
by the value of the contract per se, but by the pro rata selling costs
consumed in dealing with the breaching buyer.
The statutory language of § 2-710 seems broad enough to em-
brace post-contract as well as post-breach reliance costs. The costs
consumed in securing the breached contract could be recoverable
as "expenses. . .incurred. . . in connection with return or resale
... or otherwise resulting from the breach."117 Nevertheless,
courts have generally awarded volume sellers only the post-breach
expenses incurred in reselling the goods.:"8 This general rule
should be qualified in several respects, however. First, volume sell-
ers who choose to recover market damages rather than lost profits
never request, much less prove, the selling costs attributable to the
breached contract." 9 Second, courts have explicitly limited the re-
11 UCC § 2-710 (emphasis added).
118 See cases cited in note 120. See also Afram Export Corp. v Metallurgiki Halyps,
S.A., 772 F2d 1358, 1369 (7th Cir 1985) (seller not entitled to time value of the money tied
up in the contract when a buyer breaches); Serna, Inc. v Harmon, 742 F2d 186, 190 (5th Cir
1984) (incidental damages limited to damages occurring after the breach); Sprague v
Sumitomo Forestry Co., Ltd., 104 Wash 2d 751, 709 P2d 1200, 1206 (1985) (loss of logging
time an inappropriate item of incidental damages since the loss did not arise within the
scope of the breached contract); Malone v Carl Kisabeth Co., Inc., 726 SW2d 188 (Tex Civ
App 1987) (incidental damages limited to those costs that result in direct expense for seller);
Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v Gironda, 463 A2d 722, 726-27 (Me 1983) (plaintiff can recover
"floor plan interest" actually paid but not "wholly hypothetical charges" arising out of
seller's use of his own funds to pay off a loan); Brownie's Army & Navy Store, Inc. v B. J.
Burke, Jr., Inc., 72 AD2d 171, 424 NYS2d 800, 804 (1980) (incidental damages under § 2-
710 restricted to "commercially reasonable charges"; the words "or otherwise resulting from
the breach" do not expand the section to include attorneys' fees); Smith v Joseph, 31 UCC
Rep 1560, 1565 (DC Super 1981) (volume seller limited to costs of placing a classified ad for
the three weeks between breach and resale); Cohn v Fisher, 118 NJ Super 286, 287 A2d 222,
228 (1972) (retail seller awarded additional expenses including resale charges, storage
charges, and notice charges occasioned by buyer's default on a contract for sale of a boat).
11 In approximately a dozen reported cases under the UCC, volume sellers have chosen
to recover market damages plus incidental damages rather than lost profits. Nine of these
resulted in awards of all the incidental costs plaintiffs requested. See Bulk Oil (U.S.A.), Inc.
v Sun Oil Trading Co., 697 F2d 481, 483-84 (2d Cir 1983) (post-breach interest payments
allowed); Intermeat, Inc. v American Poultry, Inc., 575 F2d 1017, 1024 (2d Cir 1978) (fi-
nancing charges attributable to contract goods allowed); Atlas Concrete Pipe, Inc. v Roger
J. Au & Son, Inc., 467 F Supp 830, 840-41 (E D Mich 1979) (plaintiff entitled to increased
cost of capital because buyer failed to pay on open account); Cole v Melvin, 441 F Supp 193,
207 (D SD 1977) (recovery of cost incurred in care and feeding of cattle after breach); Lee
Oldsmobile, Inc. v Kaiden, 32 Md App 556, 363 A2d 270, 272, 276 (1976) (plaintiff recovered
sales commissions, brokers' commissions, floor plan interest and transportation expenses);
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covery of incidental damages to post-breach expenses only for
claims brought under § 2-708(2), which may reflect the intuition
that the plaintiff is seeking a double recovery.1 20 In short, the bar-
riers to using § 2-710 to compensate the losses of a volume seller
may be much lower than is commonly assumed. If sellers must in-
troduce those costs via § 2-710, the procedural efficiency of the
damage rule increases; sellers in general enjoy the comparative ad-
vantage in establishing uncompensated selling costs.
The preceding argument may prove too much, however. It is
quite possible, especially in the case of the retail volume seller,
that one cannot tease the ideal default rule out of the UCC's statu-
tory language, especially with its judicial gloss. There are several
reasons, however, to prefer the inadequacies of market damages to
the excesses of lost profits. Certain default rules are set not be-
cause they represent the ultimate allocations preferred by most
bargainers, but rather because they best induce one party to share
important information with the other.1" ' Consider the familiar
foreseeability limitation on consequential damages embodied in
Hadley v Baxendale.1 2 Limiting damages for the unforeseeable
Procter & Gamble Distributing Co. v Lawrence American Field Warehousing Corp., 16
NY2d 344, 213 NE2d 873 (1965) (incidental recovery included extra transportation, legal
expense and other "costs to which [seller] was subjected by buyer's default"); Peoria Harbor
Marina v McGlasson, 105 Ill App 3d 723, 434 NE2d 786, 792 (1982) (recovery of interest
accrued from the date of resale); Smith v Joseph, 31 UCC Rep 1560, 1565 (DC Super 1981)
(recovery of advertising costs); Cohn v Fisher, 118 NJ Super 286, 287 A2d 222 (1972) (plain-
tiff granted resale costs).
The remaining cases represent refusals to award attorney's fees or other speculative
losses. See East Girard Savings Ass'n v Citizens National Bank and Trust Co. of Baytown,
593 F2d 598, 604 (5th Cir 1979) (no attorneys' fees); Ernst Steel Corp. v Horn Construction
Division, Halliburton Co., 104 AD2d 55, 481 NYS2d 833, 836-40 (1984) (no recovery of im-
plied interest or implied storage costs); Brownie's Army & Navy Store, 424 NYS2d at 804
(same); Schiavi Mobile Homes, 463 A2d at 726-27 (no recovery for "wholly hypothetical"
implicit interest claimed by seller who used his own funds to pay off a loan).
120 See, for example, Neri, 285 NE2d at 315 (attorneys' fees not in the nature of the
protective expenses contemplated); The Great Western Sugar Co. v Mrs. Alison's Cookie
Co., 563 F Supp 430, 433-34 (E D Mo 1983) (recovery denied for attorneys fees and for
direct costs bearing on the profits expected under the breached contracts, such as payment
owed to beet growers as a percentage of average net return on sales); USX Corp. v Union
Pacific Resources Co., 753 SW2d 845, 856 (Tex Civ App 1988) (since seller was claiming as a
lost volume seller, expense of acquiring supplies not recoverable as incidental damages);
Industrial Circuits Co. v Terminal Communications, Inc., 26 NC App 536, 216 SE2d 919,
922-24 (1975) (no damages allowed for "bill back" charges resulting from loss of volume
discount).
" See Scott, 19 J Legal Stud at 609-11 (cited in note 65) (discussing default rules that
force information in commercial contracts); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87 (1989) (formal
analysis of "penalty" defaults).
1"" 9 Ex 341, 156 Eng Rep 145 (1854).
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consequences of breach induces the promisee to disclose to the
promisor private information concerning the consequences of
breach, thus stimulating the transmission of mutually beneficial in-
formation between the bargainers.12
This information-forcing dimension may explain the common-
law preference for market damages even in the context of volume
sales. The market damages rule induces the seller to bargain for a
more appropriate cancellation rule. By allocating the risk of can-
cellation to the party who possesses the key information concern-
ing the costs of breach, the UCC would motivate specially designed
provisions to cope with the lost volume problem.124
Even those parties who are not induced to opt out of the mar-
ket damages rule would be better off than they would be under a
lost profits regime. There are strong reasons to believe that most
parties would assign the risk of a lax cancellation rule to the seller
rather than place the equivalent risk of a harsh rule on the buyer.
At least in the retail context, sellers are better able to spread the
risk than customers. Moreover, the market damages rule, whatever
its inadequacies, enjoys the great advantage of clarity. Both parties
can better evaluate the expected deviation from the ideal than
they could under the more complex and less certain lost profits
rule.
d) Solving Nobs Chemical under the UCC. Solving the
lost volume case through a sensitive interpretation of the market
damage rules has an additional benefit. It permits courts to resur-
rect the common law "available market" test as the mechanism for
12 Goetz and Scott, 89 Yale L J at 1299-1300 (cited in note 3); William Bishop, The
Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J Legal Stud 241 (1983); Ay-
res and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 101-04 (cited in note 121).
12, Ayres and Gertner analyze the information-forcing properties of a market damages
rule. 99 Yale L J at 104-05 (cited in note 121). See also Goldberg, 57 S Cal L Rev at 294-97
(cited in note 11). Goldberg concludes that market damages are the preferable default rule
because they would motivate sellers to negotiate for fixed deposits. He argues that although
lost profits accurately measure the expected costs of breach, most parties would still prefer a
market damages default rule. He claims that sellers know more than buyers about the ex-
pected costs of cancellation, including the probability of breach. Thus, by manipulating the
damage rule, the law can encourage sellers to disclose these facts. Two problems weaken this
argument. First, buyers' uncertainty about the product's attributes should prompt sellers to
reveal any special information about the probability and impact of breach. Second, by as-
suming that the seller knows the probability of breach better than the buyer, Goldberg con-
fuses statistical probability with the probability of breach in a given case. To be sure, the
seller knows better the likelihood that a buyer will breach on average. But the probability of
breach for any particular buyer is not a function of statistical probability, but of the pecu-
liar circumstances of that particular buyer. Thus, the buyer can anticipate and control its
own behavior, and take cost-effective precautions that reduce the probability of breach.
1196 [57:1155
Case for Market Damages
regulating the access to lost profits awards. In turn, courts would
be less tempted to follow cases such as Nobs Chemical in using
§ 2-708(2) as a means of limiting the seller's market recovery.
At first glance, the plain language of the statute seems to con-
trol the choice between market damages and lost profits as a rem-
edy limitation. Access to § 2-708(2) is only permissible when the
recovery of market damages is "inadequate" to provide the seller
its post-performance expectancy. By clear implication, the UCC
does not sanction a lost profits measure on the grounds that mar-
ket damages are "excessive." But the court in Nobs Chemical re-
lied on the broad remedial statement in § 1-106 to trump the more
specific statutory language of § 2-708(2).
The Nobs Chemical court claims to identify a fundamental in-
compatibility between market damages under § 2-708(1) and the
compensation principle of § 1-106. In fact, this "incompatibility"
arises from confusion between ex ante and ex post perspectives.
The UCC scheme reflects an intuitive understanding that fixed-
price market contracts allocate market risks. Thus conceived, mar-
ket damages in cases such as Nobs Chemical do not overcompen-
sate. Rather, they grant the seller the benefit of its bargain. A
fixed-price market contract is the purchase of an option on the fu-
ture goods at the contract price. The contractual expectancy is the
right to have those goods at that price at the date of performance.
Any limitation of damages based on subsequent events frustrates
that expectancy. Indeed, only market damages will satisfy the in-
junction in § 1-106 to "put the aggrieved party in as good a posi-
tion as if the contract had been fully performed.' 125
I'5 At least one court has come close to recognizing that the full performance principle
must not trump the overarching principle that the plaintiff receive the benefit of the bar-
gain. In Trans World Metals, Inc. v Southwire Co., 769 F2d 902 (2d Cir 1985), the parties
negotiated a contract for the delivery of twelve thousand tons of aluminum at a fixed price
of 77 cents per pound. Between April 1981, when the contract was negotiated, and March
1982, the price of aluminum fell dramatically. Buyer repudiated the contract in March 1982,
after receiving and paying for the first of twelve monthly shipments. The court awarded the
seller market damages of over $7,000,000. The buyer argued that the seller should receive
only lost profits based on the profit on the first shipment projected over the life of the
contract.
The Second Circuit rejected the buyer's argument. First, the court held that nothing in
the language or history of § 2-708(2) suggests that it should apply to cases in which market
damages might overcompensate the seller. Second, the court did not think market damages
would overcompensate the seller. Only the contract-market differential would award the
seller the "'benefit of its bargain'.... [I]t simply could not have escaped these parties that
they were betting on which way aluminum prices would move." Id at 908. Because the seller
accepted the risk that prices would rise, it deserved to benefit from their fall. Distinguishing
Nobs Chemical, the court noted that this seller had not laid off the contract risk with a
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2. Buyer's damages under the UCC.
The UCC's preference for market damages in the case of
seller's breach is even more pronounced because here the UCC rec-
ognizes no lost profits option at all.126 The contract-market differ-
ential is the cornerstone of the buyer's damage alternatives. If
there is an available market for the contract goods' 27 and the buyer
never obtains or does not retain possession of the goods, 28 the
UCC directs the award of market damages. 29 In such a case, the
buyer's post-breach actions are normally not part of the bargained-
for exchange of risks. 30
Thus, in the case of buyer's damages, the UCC adopts an ex
ante perspective in allocating market risks. Not surprisingly, the
drafters therefore sought to provide alternative methods of meas-
uring the shift in market price in order to reduce the costs of en-
forcing the damage rule. Section 2-713 allows aggrieved buyers to
recover the contract-market differential by establishing the market
price prevailing at the time of the breach.' 31 In the alternative, § 2-
712 invites the buyer to establish the market shift by covering the
contract with another seller.132 In theory, then, these are precisely
equivalent methods of measuring the market price fluctuations.
The choice between a hypothetical cover or an actual cover reduces
third party. Id.
128 Plaintiff can recover lost profits in the proper case as additional consequential dam-
ages under UCC § 2-715(2).
12 For goods specially manufactured or not generally available on the market, the
buyer may pursue goods-oriented remedies such as specific performance under § 2-716. See
UCC § 2-716, Comment 3.
128 If the buyer has accepted the goods, he may recover any loss in "value" should the
goods not conform to contractual warranty. See UCC § 2-714(2).
12l Section 2-711 provides that where the seller breaches, the buyer may cover under §
2-712 and recover damages based on the contract-cover price differential, or recover dam-
ages under § 2-713 based on the contract-market price differential. See also Peters, 73 Yale
L J at 259-60 (cited in note 9).
'10 The buyer can obtain consequential damages for any general requirements (such as
the use of the goods at the date of delivery) and any particular requirements of which the
seller had reason to know at the time of contract. See UCC § 2-715(2)(a).
"I1 Section 2-713 measures the difference between the contract price and the market
price at the time the buyer learned of the breach, together with incidental and consequen-
tial damages. See UCC §§ 2-711(b) and 2-713(1). Where proof of the current market price is
difficult to establish, the buyer can, upon notice, show a comparable price at a comparable
time and place. Under § 2-723(2) the court may consider such evidence if it serves as a
reasonable substitute for the actual market, and if actual market data is not readily
available.
12 Under § 2-712, the buyer can recover the difference between the cost of cover and
the contract price if the cover contract was made reasonably, in good faith, in substitution,
and without unreasonable delay.
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the buyer's exposure to uncompensated breach costs.133 Choice
permits the aggrieved buyer to select the option most likely to
minimize breach costs in the particular case, with little or no risk
that the buyer will manipulate the damage choices strategically.13 4
Commentators have strongly criticized the freedom granted
the buyer under the UCC to select among these theoretically
equivalent damage measures. Professor Childres has called for
compulsory cover and the repeal of § 2-713.1"' Professors White
and Summers have argued that the drafters could only have meant
§ 2-713 to be a statutory liquidated damages clause, a breach in-
hibitor which bears no close relation to the plaintiff's actual loss.13 '
White and Summers, for example, assume that ex ante market
damages are always inconsistent with the principle of full perform-
ance compensation. Performance, they argue, would have given the
buyer certain goods for consumption or resale. The consequence of
performance would have been a specific economic gain or loss. The
contract-market differential itself bears no necessary relation to
the actual changes in the buyer's economic status caused by the
133 The aggrieved buyer faces the same problem as the aggrieved seller. Proof of market
price is often a difficult burden and may depend upon evidence likely to be challenged by
the seller. For evidence that sellers routinely contest estimates of market price, see Three-
Seventy Leasing Corp. v Ampex Corp., 528 F2d 993, 997-98 (5th Cir 1976); Maxwell v Nor-
wood Marine, Inc., 58 Mass App 59, 19 UCC Rep 829, 831-32 (1976); Gulf Chem. & Metal-
lurgical Corp. v Sylvan Chem. Corp., 122 NJ Super 499, 300 A2d 878, 882-83 (1973). The
buyer can reduce the costs of proof, and hence the risk of sellers evading their contractual
responsibilities, by undertaking an actual cover under the specified conditions of the statute.
A valid cover shifts to the seller the burden of proving the unreasonableness of the cover
price. See § 2-712, Comment 2 ("it is immaterial that hindsight may later prove that the
method of cover used was not the cheapest or most effective").
Because the buyer must still show that the cover action was a reasonable substitute
undertaken without unreasonable delay, the risk of seller's evasion shifts to strategic claims
that the process, rather than the price, was inadequate.
134 The UCC contemplates a free choice between the two alternatives. See UCC § 2-712,
Comment 3 ("The buyer is always free to choose between cover and damages for non-deliv-
ery ... ").
Might the buyer behave opportunistically in seeking to exploit the breaching seller?
There seems to be little opportunity for such exploitation. Assuming that the buyer cannot
systematically outguess the market, the decision to purchase substitute goods outside the
"protection" of § 2-712 should be at the buyer's own risk. Moreover, sellers may argue that a
replacement contract made within the post-breach period was actually a cover. If the fact-
finder accepts this argument, the buyer could not use a higher estimate of the contract-
market differential. This result could stem either from a determination that the buyer had
covered in fact (§ 2-713, Comment 5: market damages remedy of § 2-713 "applies only
when and to the extent that the buyer has not covered") or, more plausibly, from a determi-
nation that the evidence of cover price was conclusive as to the current market price under
§ 2-713.
'15 Childres, 72 Nw U L Rev at 837 (cited in note 9).
131 White and Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code § 6-4 at 294-95 (cited in note 9).
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breach. Thus, putting the buyer in the same position that perform-
ance would have cannot be the purpose of § 2-713.111
The argument that market damages violate the principle of
full performance compensation has two distinct effects. First, it
supports the claim that, notwithstanding the statutory language,
actual cover under § 2-712 should be the preferred or sole means of
measuring market damages. 138 As I have argued above, the princi-
pal consequence of so narrowing the injured parties' options is to
increase the costs of enforcement by exposing the buyer to strate-
gic manipulation by the breaching seller.13 9 Second, the argument
lends credence to the claim that notwithstanding the statutory lan-
guage, a buyer's damages should be limited to lost profits in appro-
priate cases. 140
The recent case of Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v Victor
Packing Co. 141 clearly illustrates the salience of the ex post per-
spective on damage measurement. Allied contracted with Victor to
purchase 185,000 pounds of raisins at 30 cents per pound with a
discount of 4 percent. Allied then contracted to resell the raisins to
several Japanese firms at a fixed price that would have yielded Al-
lied a profit on delivery of $4,462 if Victor had delivered raisins
pursuant to the contract. Because of damage to the raisin crop,
Victor breached. The market price of comparable raisins at the
time of delivery was 87 cents per pound. Several of Allied's con-
tracts with Japanese producers had a force majeure clause that
likely would have excused Allied, but at least one purchaser in-
sisted on performance. Allied subsequently sued Victor for
$150,000 in market damages under UCC § 2-713. The California
Court of Appeals denied the buyer's claim under § 2-713 and in-
stead limited the seller's liability to the "lost profits" of $4,462.
The court concluded that market damages as measured by § 2-
713 clashed fundamentally with the full performance compensation
principle of § 1-106. The court resolved the "conflict" by holding
that the broader principle of full performance compensation
trumps the narrower measure specified in § 2-713.42
The result in Allied Canners is unfortunate. As the discussion
above has shown, the full performance compensation principle
137 Id at 294.
138 Id at 304-05.
139 See text accompanying notes 96-106.
'4 White and Summers, 1 Uniform Commercial Code § 6-4 at 305-07 (cited in note 9).
14 209 Cal Rptr 60.
142 Id at 63-66.
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does not dictate the choice between the two alternative damage
measures. Section 1-106 does no more than direct that the injured
party receive the benefit of the contract. If the contract implies
market damages as the default rule, then § 1-106 is entirely consis-
tent with a denial of the seller's lost profits defense. Indeed, only
market damages will put such a buyer in as good a position as if
the contractual opportunity had been realized.
One way to avoid the trap of measuring the contractual expec-
tancy ex post is to focus on what the aggrieved party has pur-
chased by the contract. The goods are purchased and sold at the
time for performance. The function of the contract is to buy and
sell an option on the future price of those goods. As with any op-
tion, the risk can be hedged by selling some (or all) of the option
rights to a third party. Yet no one would seriously argue that when
an option holder attempts to exercise its rights, the breacher can
resist damages for non-performance by pointing to the post-con-
tract actions of the option holder. The entitlement to market dam-
ages ensures that the injured party receives the benefit of its
bargain.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON DAMAGES FOR
BREACH OF MARKET CONTRACTS
The strong inclination of courts to award lost profits damages
is puzzling. In the case of remedy limitations, the courts show a
remarkable willingness to award windfall gains to a deliberate
breacher. In the lost volume cases, courts show an equally perplex-
ing willingness to impose punitive damages on consumer buyers.
What accounts for this persistent bias toward lost profits? One an-
swer is the tendency of legal analysts to tell the story of contract
breach ex post, and thus to define full performance compensation
by reference to what has happened in a particular case. The dis-
cussion above has shown that one must measure full performance
compensation at the time of contract, as though we did not know
how the story would end.
The preoccupation with ex post compensation leads modern
courts and commentators to assume that the parties to a market
contract have bargained for completion of the contemplated ex-
change. Thus, for example, in the case of a jobber or a middleman
who never acquires the contract goods, it is assumed that the seller
is entitled to damages equal to the estimated profits from com-
pleted performance. From there it is a simple step to conclude that
lost profits damages better measure the injured party's loss. Mar-
ket damages do not necessarily match the estimated profits from
completion.
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The error in the analysis is the assumption that the injured
party's expectancy is his estimated profit. Market contracts involve
different risks and different expectations. A fixed-price contract in
a market context is an option on the future price or future supply.
Compensatory damages should thus protect the value of the op-
tion, not of the completed performance. In the limited remedy
case, the option is more valuable than the completed performance
and a lost profits award undercompensates. On the other hand, in
the lost volume case, the option is worth less than the completed
performance, and lost profits damages are excessive.
This analysis follows from the fact that the legal remedy pack-
aged with the contract is a part of the product sold. To the extent
that the law starts the parties off with undesirable product fea-
tures, such as a harsh cancellation policy that is not the optimal
mix of legal rights and tangible product characteristics, a variety of
unhappy circumstances can result. Volume sellers, for example,
would prefer to exploit economies of scale over a wider range of
customers by offering a more attractive option to cancel. By using
a lost profits measure as the default rule, the law makes it more
difficult for the parties to accomplish their contractual objectives.
These effects are similar to the consequences of using lost
profits to limit market damages. Once one regards the legal reme-
dies as part of the product, it is clear that the optimal product mix
should not depend on conditions the buyer is unable to observe
except at great cost. This, of course, is the point of the critical
analysis of Nobs Chemical. The same is true of lost volume cases
such as Neri. The threat of lost profits requires a buyer to under-
take a complex inquiry into the seller's costs. In both instances, a
market damages rule enables the buyer to determine the price of
the product that he is purchasing at less cost. The seller, in turn,
becomes able to offer products at different prices to different
buyers.
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